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 In the first essay, we examine the conditions under which the regulatory process leads to 
collusion, and if there is collusion, whether it will be observed in the political or bureaucratic sector. 
The political cost disciplines the politician, while monitoring intensity limits the bureaucrat’s 
discretion. According to our model, high political pressure is critical to achieve a state with no 
collusion between agents. If the political cost is relatively small, higher penalties on the bureaucrat 
will just open the possibility of political corruption. In a politician’s initiative regime, if the transfer 
offered to the politician in exchange for legislative effort is less than the payoffs earned by 
monitoring bureaucrat, political collusion does not occur. If monitoring costs are very large, the 
politician might decide not to control the bureaucrat, and corruption will take place in that sector. In 
a voter’s initiative regime, a no-collusion state can be accomplished by choosing the levels of 
monitoring and political control appropriately.  
 
The second essay provides an explanation to the fact that the middle class is 
overrepresented in the welfare state. We claim that this observation is closely related to the 
implicit allegiance with other social groups. The allegiance can take place between different 
subgroups within the middle class. This type of behavior is captured by the pooling equilibrium of 
the model. The middle class obtains its ideal policy if it pursues a moderate policy change from 
the current status quo. We show that there exists a pooling equilibrium which supports a policy 
change toward the ideal policy of the middle class. If the differences in political power between 
social groups are small, a separating equilibrium exists in which the ideal policies of the upper 
middle class are adopted. Such proposal is unconditionally supported by the rich, i.e. in a 
separating equilibrium, external allegiance is crucial.  
 
The third essay considers a model where state governments are engaged in a strategic 
determination of corporate profit tax rates under different systems of formula apportionment. 
We show that in a symmetric equilibrium, the tax rate is inefficiently low due to the strategic 
interaction between state governments. However, we also show that the degree of inefficiency is 
less severe when the formula relies on output shares. Consequently, we can claim that the recent 
shift by most states in the U.S. towards a FA that employs only sales shares constitutes a welfare 
improvement. However, there is still a distortion due to tax competition between state 
governments. A cooperative formula apportionment may weaken the negative externalities 
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1.1 Introduction  
The three essays in this dissertation address issues in public economics and public 
finance. The first paper examines corruption in the political and administrative sectors, 
simultaneously considering interactions between firms, politicians and bureaucrats in a 
two-stage model. Some societies experience severe bureaucratic collusion, while political 
collusion is present in both developing and developed world. According to Global 
Corruption Barometer survey by Transparency International, 2003, “in three countries out 
of four, political parties are singled out as the institution from which citizens would most 
like to eliminate corruption in both the developed and developing worlds.” Political 
corruption is a serious matter even in developed countries. Our paper considers a model 
that highlights the main characteristics of the legislative and executive process followed 
in many nations. There is typically a stage at which the general law is designed, and next, 
there is a second stage at which the law is actually implemented. Considering the 
conclusions of the previously mentioned report, and the two-stage policy process, we 
examine the trade-off between political and bureaucratic collusion, and explore the 
conditions under which the regulatory process leads to collusion. We conjecture that 
lower bureaucratic corruption in the developed world could be consistent with a highly 
corrupted political process.  
In the second essay, we examine the overrepresentation of the middle class in the 
welfare state, by using a standard signaling model. According to Director's Law, “public 
expenditures are made for the primary benefit of the middle class and financed with taxes 
which are borne in considerable part by the poor and rich” (Stigler 1970). The fact that 
the middle class is the main beneficiary of redistributive policies is not limited to the 
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western world. Middle class bias is pervasive phenomenon. “Director’s Law” is 
consistent with the standard median voter theorem. However, our paper stresses that the 
middle class overrepresentation in the welfare state is deeply related to the implicit 
allegiance with other social groups. The internal allegiances within the middle class have 
not been addressed before. Suppose that the middle class is composed of two sub-classes: 
a lower and an upper middle class. When two sub-classes send the same political 
message to the policymaker, the middle class obtains its ideal policy if they pursue a 
moderate policy change from the current status quo. We show that the middle class 
overrepresentation in the welfare state is a possible outcome of our model, which can be 
explained by an implicit allegiance with other social groups. 
In the third essay, we examine a model where local governments are engaged in a 
strategic determination of corporate profit tax rates under different systems of formula 
apportionment. In an effort to encourage tax uniformity, the Multi-state Tax Compact in 
1967 established that the three factors considered in the apportionment formula are to be 
weighted equally. In spite of the compact, most states have recently deviated from the 
uniform formula apportionment and moved towards a greater weight on the sales portion 
of the corporate income tax. The apportionment of a firm’s total profits across states 
creates complicated incentive effects. Due to the strategic interaction between state 
governments, the equilibrium tax rates are inefficiently low. The present paper extends 
the formula apportionment literature by considering the effects of different formulas on 
the equilibrium tax rate and the provision of local goods. 
1.2 Overview of Dissertation 
1.2.1 Collusion, Political Control and Discretion 
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In this paper, we study the conditions under which the regulatory policy process leads to 
collusion. We highlight the opportunities for collusion and interactions among the agents 
involved at different stages of the regulatory policy process. Asymmetry in the 
distribution of power and information allow the politician and the bureaucrat to act 
discretionally. The politician can change the regulation itself, favoring the firm, while the 
bureaucrat can favor the firm by relaxing the implementation of the regulatory rules. 
Given the firm’s preference for no regulation and the discretionary power of the regulator, 
the possibility of collusion occurs. Current literature on corruption has concentrated 
mainly on the transaction between the firm and the bureaucrat at the implementation 
stage, or the relationship and interactions between interest groups and the politician. This 
dichotomy prevents a comprehensive understanding of bureaucratic and political 
corruption which, in reality, are very closely related. Our two-stage model captures the 
whole process of policy making and implementation and sheds new insights on 
corruption in the political and administrative sector.   
In our model, control of the politician’s behavior will have an impact on the 
bureaucrat.  The interaction between the politician and the bureaucrat is mediated by the 
firm who pursues an advantageous treatment. According to our model, bureaucratic and 
political collusion are deeply interconnected in the sense that they can be viewed are 
substitutes. We stress that no bureaucratic collusion will be a result of political collusion. 
This conclusion is consistent with the survey result of Transparency International (2003): 
“even in the developed world, political corruption is serious.” 
When the politician monopolizes the power to control the bureaucrat, bureaucratic 
collusion is simply replaced by political collusion. Since the politician seeks private 
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benefits, if the cost of monitoring the bureaucrat is too high, the politician may decide not 
to control the bureaucrat. Finally, we examine the corruption problem when the voter has 
the competence to discipline both the bureaucrat and the politician. However, such a 
regime does not insure a no-collusion state if the monitoring cost is too high. One 
implication of the model is that a no-collusion state is exceptional. There are two ways to 
prevent political corruption. One is to discipline a politician by imposing high political 
pressure, and the other is to provide a rent to the politician when she successfully 
monitors the bureaucrat.   
1.2.2 Effects of Policy Preferences on Policy Outcome with an Incompletely 
Informed Politician 
The allegiance among social groups affects the outcome of the political process (Mule 
(2001)). This paper focuses on how the allegiance among social groups affects the 
outcome of the political process, in particular, in favor of the middle class. We introduce 
two types of allegiance: one is the internal allegiance, within the middle class, and the 
other is external, i.e. an allegiance with the poor or rich. To capture the external 
allegiance, we consider three social groups: poor, middle class, and rich. Internal 
allegiance is related to interactions between two subgroups within the middle class. The 
external allegiance is implicitly reflected through the payoffs function of an office 
seeking politician.  
Internal allegiance within the middle class is essential to obtain a pooling 
equilibrium which is robust to change in the distribution of power in the society. There 
exists a pooling equilibrium in which the policy outcome is close to the one desired by 
 6
the middle class. The pooling equilibrium is supported by an external allegiance as well 
as an internal allegiance.  
A separating equilibrium may exist but it is not robust, because a separating 
equilibrium mainly relies on an external allegiance. Conflict of interest between 
subgroups within the middle class may be observed in a separating equilibrium. One 
interesting result related to the conflict of interest between subgroups is that as the 
proportion of the upper middle class increases, the lower middle class may lose its 
capacity to influence on the policy choice. Overrepresentation of the middle class in the 
welfare state is realized through both types of equilibrium; a separating equilibrium is 
fragile and not robust.  
1.2.3  Apportionment Formula and Strategic Competition  
If a corporation has business activities located in multiple jurisdictions, the local 
authority can levy a tax on income generated in that state. However, as measuring income 
earned within each jurisdiction presents a difficult conceptual problem, a system of 
formula apportionment that allocates income across states is usually adopted. Formula 
apportionment, as used in the U.S., asserts that the proportion of a multi-state firm’s 
income earned in a given state is a weighted average of the proportion of the firm’s total 
sales, property, and payroll in that state.  
The choice of the specific formula apportionment is an avenue through which tax 
competition between state governments occurs. The apportionment of a firm’s total 
profits across states creates complicated incentive effects. On one hand, firms operating 
in different regions will react to different formulas by changing the allocation of property, 
sales and workers across regions. On the other hand, given that the tax policy selected by 
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different state governments affects residents of other states, some kind of strategic 
interaction can be expected. As the EU economy becomes integrated, the issues of tax 
coordination and tax competition become very relevant. Hence, the experience of the US 
in the application of a formula apportionment system is of particular interest for the EU.  
We find that the inefficiency is more severe under a formula apportionment that 
exclusively considers capital shares relative to one that only employs sales shares, 
leading to a lower level of welfare in the regions. As a result, a transition towards a 
formula apportionment that gives more importance to the sales proportion (which is 
consistent with the evidence from US) might constitute a welfare improvement for the 
economy as a whole.  
Multistate firm’s reactions to tax policies are key elements in the literature of tax 
competition. Under a sales share formula apportionment, capital becomes less responsive 
to changes in the tax policy. Negative externalities on other states are created by the 
strategic determination of the corporate tax rates. We show that if tax rates are 
determined cooperatively (i.e. as if the federal government was in charge of setting the 






































Democratic societies decide their rules, policies and laws through a process which 
generally involves two stages:  the design of the law or policy, and its implementation. 
For instance, in the case of environmental regulation, a politician usually designs the 
regulatory structure, while a bureaucrat implements it. Both the choice of the specific 
regulatory framework and its implementation affect the value of the firm subject to the 
regulatory regime. As a result, the firm faces an incentive to reduce the regulatory burden 
imposed on her. Reducing the regulatory burden can be achieved by either capturing the 
politician or the bureaucrat. Hence, given that any policy goes through these two stages 
(i.e. policy design and implementation), corruption opportunities are always present in he 
spheres of the political and administrative sectors.  
According to Global Corruption Barometer survey by Transparency International, 
2003, “in three countries out of four, political parties are singled out as the institution 
from which citizens would most like to eliminate corruption in both the developed and 
developing worlds.” In a narrow sense, corruption is interpreted as activities of 
transferring bribes to a bureaucrat in exchange for an advantage for specific interests. 
However, as the survey by “Transparency International” implies, political corruption is 
still a serious matter even in developed countries.  
Based on the previous observations and the two-stage policy process, we 
conjecture in the present paper that political corruption might be a substitute for 
bureaucratic corruption. According to this conjecture, a lower bureaucratic corruption in 
the developed world could be consistent with a highly corrupted political process. Active 
interest groups in democratic societies usually choose to target the legislative stage of 
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policy making. We define the capturing of the politician by the interest groups as political 
collusion.  
This paper examines the trade-off between political collusion and bureaucratic 
collusion. We study the conditions under which the regulatory policy process leads to 
collusion. We highlight the opportunities for collusion and interactions among the agents 
involved at different stages of the regulatory policy process. Asymmetry in the 
distribution of power and information allow the politician and the bureaucrat to act 
discretionally. The politician can change the regulation itself, favoring the firm, while the 
bureaucrat can favor the firm by relaxing the implementation of the regulatory rules. 
Given the firm’s preference for no regulation and the discretionary power of the regulator, 
the possibility of collusion occurs. The firm can offer transfers to either the politician or 
the bureaucrat in exchange for a more benign regulatory scheme.  
This paper is closely related to the literature on bureaucratic corruption, 
legislative control on bureaucracy, and lobbying games. As far as we know, the existing 
literature on corruption has concentrated mainly on the transaction between the firm and 
the bureaucrat at the implementation stage of the regulatory policy, or the relationship 
between interest groups and the politician. However, the two alternatives have not been 
simultaneously considered in a single model. We would like to fill this gap by using a 
simple two-stage game model.  
In the second stage of the game, given the regulatory policy announced by the 
politician in the first stage, the firm offers a bribe to the bureaucrat. In the first stage, the 
politician’s effort determines the probability of occurrence of two states: a regulation-free 
state under which pollution is allowed, and a state where pollution is prohibited. The firm 
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offers a transfer to induce a higher effort from the politician and, consequently, increase 
the probability of the no-regulation state. The transfer may take the form of a contribution 
to the politician’s campaign. The main objective of our model is to study the nature of 
collusion in this context. If colluding with the politician gives higher benefits than 
colluding with the bureaucrat, political collusion is realized, and vice versa.  
Our model about collusion between the regulated firms, bureaucratic agencies, 
and politicians is related to “capture theory”, addressed by Stigler (1971) by which 
regulatory agencies are captured by the regulated firms. We introduce a politician as an 
additional target of capturing. The foundation for bureaucratic collusion is “discretion” 
exercised by bureaucrats. Niskanen’s budget maximizing bureaucrats is transformed into 
bureaucrats who could favor the firm in the policy implementation in our model. 
(Niskanen, (1971, 1975)) However, some scholars are skeptical whether bureaucrats can 
successfully escape from the politician’s control. Bureaucrats are active participants in 
the process of policymaking, but they are tuning their policy preferences to the legislative 
and executive politician’s policy preferences (Calvert et al, 1989) Informational 
advantages exploited by bureaucrats are mitigated by the politician’s designing agency 
structure. (Banks et al, 1992) 
There are three areas of literature about political collusion and bureaucratic 
collusion. The first strand of literature studies the interaction between special interest 
groups and the policymaker (Grossman and Helpman (2001)). At the legislative stage, the 
special interest group is engaged in lobbying to obtain an advantage. In this paper, the 
firm assumes the role of the special interest group. We show that the incentive for the 
firm to interact with the politician is weakened by the presence of the bureaucratic stage.  
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The second strand of the literature is related to the problem of controlling a 
bureaucrat, since bureaucratic discretion and expertise leads to bureaucratic corruption. A 
complicated regulatory framework induces collusion between a public officer and a firm 
at the implementation stage of the policy (Kaufmann (1998) and Eskeland et al. (1999)). 
More discretion due to the complexity of the rules or information asymmetry leads to 
higher chances of collusion. (Breton and Wintrobe (1982)).  Mookherjee et al. (1994) 
investigate the equilibrium bribe and corruption level. They show that a stronger penalty 
on the bureaucrat may increase the bribe paid by the firm. According to Marjit et al. 
(1998), if a public officer can manipulate the detection of crime, crime can never be 
controlled despite a reward scheme. Even if the announced penalty on crime is very high, 
discretion by the public officer might lower the probability of detecting crime. This 
strand of the corruption literature limits itself to the issue of how to control the bureaucrat 
at the implementation stage. One of the ways to prevent bureaucratic corruption is to pay 
the bureaucrat a sufficiently high wage. Acemoglu et al. (1998) show that the social cost 
of preventing bureaucratic collusion using effective wages might be significant because 
the rent given to the bureaucrat to prevent corruption induces over-employment in the 
public sector, leads to under-employment in the productive private sector, and lowers the 
overall productivity of the society. The problem of controlling the bureaucrat is still an 
important ingredient in our model. But, we start from the observation that both the 
bureaucrat and the politician can be involved in a collusive behavior. We argue that our 
comprehensive approach provides a better framework for the analysis of bureaucratic 
corruption.  
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The third line of literature is related to the interaction between the politician and 
the bureaucrat. The role of the politician and the bureaucrat in the decision making 
process is studied by Alesina et al. (2003). They consider a division of labor between 
politicians and bureaucrats in terms of the tasks suitable for with each other. Boadway et 
al. (2003) analyze the interaction between the politician and the bureaucrat under 
asymmetric information trying to find out how to discipline the bureaucrat to overcome 
information asymmetry. Boyer et al. (1999) emphasize the possibility of limiting the 
politician’s discretion to obtain political contributions from the interest groups.  
In our model, the control of the politician behavior will also have an impact on the 
bureaucrat.  The interaction between the politician and the bureaucrat is mediated by the 
firm who pursues an advantageous treatment. Our attempt to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of collusion is closely related to Börner (2004). According to our model, 
bureaucratic and political collusion are deeply interconnected in the sense that they can 
be viewed are substitutes. We stress that no bureaucratic collusion might be a result of 
political collusion. This conclusion is consistent with the survey of Transparency 
International, 2003, “even in the developed world, political corruption is serious.” 
Disciplining a bureaucrat is required to realize a collusion-free society. When the 
politician monopolizes the power to control the bureaucrat, bureaucratic collusion is 
simply replaced by political collusion. Since the politician seeks private benefits, if the 
monitoring cost is too high, the politician may decide not to control the bureaucrat. 
Finally, we examine the corruption problem when the voter has the competence to 
discipline both the bureaucrat and the politician. However, such regime does not insure a 
no-collusion state, if the monitoring cost is too high. 
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2. The Model 
2.1. Outline of the whole game  
Figure 1 presents our basic model’s timeline. 
Figure 1: Timeline of collusion  
                      Policy designing                                        Policy implementation     
0 1 2 3 




Firm offers bribe to 
bureaucrat 
Payoffs are realized 
 
The regulation procedure on the firm consists of enacting a regulation statute by the 
politician, which is implemented by the bureaucrat. Only the politician has the authority 
to determine the directives of the regulation on the firm. In this case, the law determines 
whether pollution is allowed or prohibited. We assume the regulation clauses allowing 
pollution requires the effort of politician and she succeeds in the deregulation allowing 
pollution with some probability. We also assume that the politician is not omnipotent in 
her legislature activities. There exists a monotonic relationship between her effort and the 
possibility of allowing pollution in the regulation clauses. If politician exerts an effort e  
to enact the clauses to allow pollution, then, the new clause is enacted with probability 
of )(ep , allowing pollution. With probability [1 - )(ep ], in spite of politician’s effort, 
pollution is still banned. The majority rule in the legislature, the political influence of 
opponent interest group and the possibility of being reelected in the campaign justifies 
the uncertain outcome of legislation for allowing pollution.   
When pollution is allowed, the payoff of the firm is V  and when pollution is 
banned, the payoff of the firm is V . The difference, V∆  = V -  V  is a positive number. 
This difference induces the firm to look for a way to persuade the politician to allow her 
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to pollute. The effort level e  to be exerted is not observable to the firm. However, the 
firm is informed about the monotonic relationship between effort and the outcome to 
allow pollution through )(ep . The outcome of the legislature effort is verifiable. The firm 
offers transfers to the politician. If the politician accepts the contract and the expected 
payoff of the firm from it dominates her expected payoff from bribing the bureaucrat in 

























If the politician’s effort to allow pollution fails and pollution is still banned, the 
firm deals with bureaucrat, who has the ability of weakening the regulation. Since the 
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incremental benefit from polluting is V∆  = V - V , the firm has an incentive to persuade 
the bureaucrat to overlook the pollution or not to report it to the authority. The firm offers 
the bribe b  to induce the bureaucrat to misreport. This constitutes the second stage of our 
bribing game. By using backward induction, we first solve the second stage subgame in 
which the bureaucrat and the firm interact with each other. The actions and the payoffs of 
the bureaucrat and the firm are anticipated by a rationally behaved politician and the firm 
in the first stage of the game. By comparing the net expected payoffs from the contract 
with the politician with the net expected payoff from bribing the bureaucrat, the firm 
finds out its best strategy.  
2.2. Second stage: equilibrium bribe when firm moves first  
If the firm decides not to pollute, the payoff is simply V  and the game ends. When the 
firm pollutes, it obtains V . The firm offers a bribe b to the bureaucrat to overlook 
pollution, and the bureaucrat decides whether to accept or not. If the bureaucrat rejects 
the offer, and reports truthfully and the firm pays a fine f  for polluting when the law 
prohibits pollution. The payoff of the firm is ( fV − ) and bureaucrat receives a zero 
payoff.   
Consider the case in which the bureaucrat accepts the bribe and collusion occurs 
between the bureaucrat and the firm. Then, the bureaucrat does not report what really 
happened (i.e. bureaucrat reports “no pollution”). The bureaucrat is monitored with 
intensity m , i.e. with probability m  misreporting is detected. When collusion is detected, 
a fine f  is imposed on the firm and a penalty c  is imposed on the bureaucrat. The firm’s 
and bureaucrat’s payoffs are ( fV − - b ) and (b - c ), respectively. With probability  
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(1 - m ), collusion is not detected, so the firm and the bureaucrat obtain (V - b ) and b . 
As a result, the bureaucrat’s expected payoff from colluding with the firm is  
)( cbm −  + (1 - bm)  = mcb − . 
The bureaucrat accepts the bribe if mcb −  ≥   0. Therefore, the equilibrium bribe in this 
sub-game is,1 b * = mc  
 
Proposition 1 (equilibrium bribe to bureaucrat) 
When the firm moves first or has the full bargaining power, higher values of m  and c   
increases the amount of the bribe that induces the bureaucrat to accept the offer. 
(Mookerjee et al. 1994)2 
By plugging b * = mc  into ( mfbV −− ), the expected payoff of the firm, denoted 
with β , is given by 11 
β  = Max { )( fcmV +− , V }.  
The firm compares the payoff from colluding with the bureaucrat, β  with the payoff 
from colluding with the politician. The payoff from colluding with the politician is 
explained in the next section. 
 
                                                 
1 When the bureaucrat moves first or has full bargaining power, the firm accepts the offer proposed by the 
bureaucrat if VbVmfbVm >−−+−− ))(1()( . The equilibrium bribe is then given by mfVb −∆= . This 
amount constitutes the upper bound of bribe that the firm is willing to pay. The feasible value for bribe is 
Vbcfm ∆≤≤+ )( . Therefore, the equilibrium bribe when the bureaucrat and the firm are engaged in a 
Nash Bargaining game is ))(1( mfVvvmcb −∆−+= , where v is the bargaining power of the firm and (1- 
v ) is the bargaining power of the bureaucrat.  
 
2 When bureaucrat moves first, the increase in V∆ enlarges the amount of bribe and the increase in f    
and in m reduce the bribe. If the firm and the bureaucrat are engaged in the Nash bargaining solution, m  
enlarges the bribe only if c  >  f .  
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2.3. First-stage: interaction between politician and firm 
The outcome of the politician’s effort is verifiable, while politician’s effort is not. 
Based on the observed outcome, the firm offers the following transfer scheme: if the law 
allows pollution, 1L  is paid to the politician; and 0L  otherwise. We assume that there 
exists a monotonic relationship between the effort level exerted by the politician and the 
probability that the legislature outcome is “no pollution”, represented by )(' ep  > 0. In 
this first stage of game between the firm and the politician, the firm moves first by 
offering the transfers. Given { 1L , 0L }, the politician chooses her optimal effort level e . 
Anticipating the reaction of the politician, the firm chooses { 1L , 0L } to induce an effort 
of politician. Regardless of which the legislature outcome is realized, the cost of effort for 
the politician is 
2
2de . For simplicity, we assume that )(ep = e . Suppose that the median 
voter prefers no pollution. The deviation from the median voter’s preference is counted as 
a political cost, represented by a  when pollution is allowed. Then, the politician chooses 
the optimal effort e  that solves the following problem.  
}e{
max   e [ 1L  - 2
2de  - a ] + (1 – e )[L 0  - 2
2de ] 
The first order condition identifies the relationship between e  and the associated 
transfers { 1L , 0L }: e  = d
aLL −− 01 . We know that β is the payoff of the firm when it 
colludes with the bureaucrat if the pollution is not allowed. Let α = V  denote the payoff 
of the firm when it colludes with the politician and the pollution is allowed. The firm’s 
expected payoffs from contributing to the politician is e [α - 1L ] + (1 - e )[ β - 0L ] and 
the firm’s payoff from bribing the bureaucrat is β . Assuming that the individual 
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rationality condition of the politician is not binding, which is verified in the appendix, the 
firm’s problem is   
}L,L{ 21
max    (
d
aLL −− 01 )[α - 1L ] + [1 - ( d
aLL −− 01 )][ β - 0L ] 
The first order condition of this problem with respect to 1L  is  
1L  - 0L  = 2
a+− βα  
The first order condition with respect to 0L  is reduced to  
- ( βα − ) + 2( 1L  -  0L ) - a  = -1 <  0 
Then, according to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, 0L  = 0. From the first order condition 
with respect to 1L ,  
1L  = 2
a+− βα . 
The transfer scheme offered to the politician and the effort level chosen by the politician 
are given respectively by *1L  = 2
)( acfm ++ , *0L  = 0, e * = d
acfm
2
)( −+ . 
If net expected benefit from offering transfers to the politician at the first stage of 
the game exceeds the firm’s payoffs from bureaucratic collusion, the firm will prefer to 
offer transfers { 1L , 0L } to induce the politician to exert a higher effort level. This 
constitutes political collusion condition. Then, the political collusion condition is given 
by  
e [α - 1L ] + (1 - e )[ β - 0L ]  > β  
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)( −+ , *1L  = 2
)( acfm ++  , *0L  = 0, and α = V , β = V - 
)( cfm + into the political collusion condition, we obtain 2 )( cfm +  > )( cfm + + a . 
Then, the political collusion condition is reduced to )( cfm + > a .  
 
Proposition 2 (transfer to the politician) 
1. The political collusion condition is )( cfm + >  a  
2. Under the restriction of )( cfm + > a , the transfers { *1L  = 2
)( acfm ++  , *0L  = 0} 
offered by the firm to the politician entails the politician’s effort  




)( −+  , only political collusion occurs.  
As far as the political collusion condition holds, the transfers are sufficient to induce the 
politician to allow pollution. The net payoff from colluding with the politician outweighs 
the net payoff from colluding with the bureaucrat. The implication of this proposition is 
that no bureaucratic collusion might be associated with political collusion.  
 
3. Analysis of collusion condition with exogenous monitoring 
Consider the political collusion condition: )( cfm +  > a . LHS )( cfm +  is interpreted as 
the firm’s benefit from capturing the politician, it is an expected value of the fine borne 
by the firm plus the penalty borne by the bureaucrat. RHS a  is the political cost for the 
politician. From β  = Max { )( fcmV +− , V }, firm’s benefit from capturing politician is 
associated with the cost of bureaucratic collusion. The cost of bureaucratic collusion is 
transformed into the benefit of political collusion. Political collusion is a substitute for 
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bureaucratic collusion in our model. Suppose that )( cfm +  < a . By offering transfers 
{ *1L  = 2
)( acfm ++ , *0L  = 0 }, the firm may induce the effort of e * = d
acfm
2
)( −+ , but 
capturing the politician is not valuable to the firm because the expected value of 
colluding with the politician is less than the expected value of colluding with the 
bureaucrat. Transfers to the politician are too expensive, compared with the expected 
benefit )( cfm + . The firm can achieve higher payoffs by bribing the bureaucrat in the 
second stage of the game. However, while )( cfm +  < a  excludes political collusion, it 
does not insure bureaucratic collusion.  
By the similar reasoning of political collusion condition, bureaucratic collusion 
condition is  
)( fbVm −−  + )( bVm −  >   V  
Since mcb = , this condition can be transformed into  
)( cfmV +−  >  V . 
Let V∆  = V - V . Then, the bureaucratic collusion condition is simplified to V∆  >  
)( cfm + . Therefore, if V∆  < )( cfm + , there is no bureaucratic collusion. V∆  is the 
benefit from bureaucratic collusion and )( cfm + is the cost of bureaucratic collusion. 
Recall that the political collusion condition is )( cfm +  > a . The baseline for both 
bureaucratic collusion and political collusion is )( cfm + . We mentioned that )( cfm +  
is the firm’s benefit from political collusion. However, when the bureaucrat and the firm 
collude, )( cfm + is the expected cost. V∆ is the benefit from bureaucratic collusion. 
Hence, V∆  < )( cfm +  precludes bureaucratic collusion. In the political sector, because 
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)( cfm + is the firm’s benefit and a  is a cost, )( cfm +  < a  also precludes the political 
corruption.  
By combining the no collusion condition in political sector and the no collusion 
condition in the bureaucratic sector, we obtain the no collusion condition V∆ < )( cfm +  
<  a . As a consequence, if the latter is satisfied, the pure strategy of the firm is not to 
bribe neither the politician nor the bureaucrat. In order to analyze all possible cases of 
bureaucratic and political collusion condition, consider the following two situations: (i) 
V∆  <  a , the political cost dominates the bureaucratic collusion benefit; (ii) a  < V∆ , 
the bureaucratic collusion benefit dominates the political cost.  
Case (1): V∆  <  a  
By changing the relative value of V∆ , a  and )( cfm + , we can identify three different 
cases. For sufficiently low values of m , )( cfm +  < V∆  < a . In this case, the firm 
chooses to capture bureaucrat. Therefore, only bureaucratic collusion occurs in this 
situation. For moderate levels of m  such that V∆ < )( cfm + < a . Because capturing the 
politician is too expensive, political collusion does not occur. To the politician, exerting 
legislature effort is too costly, due to high a . The bureaucratic collusion benefit V∆ is 
smaller than the bureaucratic collusion cost )( cfm + , so bureaucratic collusion is not 
observed. For higher levels of m , V∆ < a  < )( cfm + . Bureaucratic collusion is not 
observed, and only political collusion occurs.  
Case (2): V∆  >  a  
If )( cfm +  < a  < V∆ , only bureaucratic collusion occurs. If a  < )( cfm +  < V∆ , 
political collusion is prevented, and only bureaucratic collusion occurs. Finally, if a  < 
V∆  < )( cfm + , only political collusion occurs.  
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Proposition 3 (no collusion condition) 
Let m~  and m̂  be defined by a  = m~ )( cf +  and V∆  = m̂ )( cf + . 
1. Let  V∆  < a , given the value of )( cf + , monitoring intensity less than m̂  leads 
to  bureaucratic collusion, while monitoring intensity larger than m~  leads to  
political collusion . No collusion is realized at moderate level of monitoring 
intensity between m̂  and m~ . 
2. Let  a  < V∆ , at monitoring intensity less than m̂ , bureaucratic collusion occurs 
and at monitoring intensity larger than m̂ , political collusion occurs.  
This proposition shows the importance of the political cost in achieving the no-pollution 
(collusion) state. If there was no political pressure, which actually discipline the 
politicians, collusion will always be observed. With relatively low political costs 
compared to bureaucratic benefit, the society has no opportunity of achieving the no  
pollution state. Only if V∆ < a , no collusion is possible. Under the rigid regulation 
legislature, V∆  becomes bigger and might outweigh the political cost parameter. The 
firm’s incentive to avoid the regulatory burden combined with low level of political cost 
or low level of penalty leads to collusion which might be political or bureaucratic. 
According to proposition 3, monitoring intensity should be moderate to obtain no 
collusion state. Extreme value of monitoring intensity leads only to bureaucratic collusion 
or political collusion, given the penalty level on the firm and the bureaucrat who are 
engaged in collusion.  
When V∆ > a , it is not possible to obtain no collusion, because bureaucratic 
benefit dominates political cost. High level of m  without being disciplined by political 
pressure simply provides the opportunity for political collusion. Without sufficient 
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political pressure, there only remains the possibility between political collusion and 
bureaucratic collusion. 
Case (3): V∆ < a  with m = 1 
Consider the extreme values of m = 0 and m = 1. With monitoring intensity m = 0 and 
V∆  < a , all three cases are reduced to 0 < V∆  < a , only bureaucratic collusion occurs. 
Since the probability of being detected is so low, the firm is willing to collude with the  
bureaucrat. With monitoring intensity m = 1 and under the parameter value of V∆  < a , 
we again face the following three cases.  
   Region I: )( cf +  < V∆  < a  entails bureaucratic collusion 
                          Region II: V∆ < )( cf +  < a   entails no collusion 
                          Region III: V∆ < a  < )( cf +   entails political collusion 
Case (4): V∆  >  a  with m = 1 
When  V∆  > a , with monitoring intensity m = 0, the three cases are reduced to 0  < a  < 
V∆ , only bureaucratic collusion occurs. With monitoring intensity m = 1, we face the 
following three cases. 
                         Region IV: )( cf +  < a  < V∆  entails bureaucratic collusion 
      Region V  :  a  < )( cf +  < V∆  entails bureaucratic collusion 
                         Region VI: a  < V∆  < )( cf +  entails political collusion 
Especially, in case region I, m  = 1 cannot prevent bureaucratic collusion. Compared with 
the value of bureaucratic benefit V∆ , the penalty term )( cf + is too small. In the region 
V, )( cf + is not small but V∆ is sufficiently large. With a small amount of )( cf +  and a 
large amount of V∆ , perfect monitoring does not preclude collusion between the 
bureaucrat and the firm. Similar claim can also be argued between a  and )( cfm + . In 
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the region III and region VI, perfect monitoring induces political collusion when m  = 1 
is associated with medium level of political cost (region III) and low level of political 
cost (region VI).   
 
Proposition 4 (impact of perfect monitoring) 
1. Zero monitoring intensity leads to bureaucratic collusion, regardless of the level 
of political cost 
2. In the region I, IV and V, perfect monitoring does not preclude bureaucratic 
collusion and the firm does not offer the contribution funds to the politician.  
      In the region III and VI, perfect monitoring facilitates political collusion.  
Proposition 4 examines whether penalty on the bureaucrat and fine on the firm are useful 
to prevent collusion. Even perfect monitoring might not work.  Perfect monitoring may 
not prevent bureaucratic collusion when the sum of the penalty on the bureaucrat and the 
fine on the firm is not sufficiently high. The generous penalty leads to bureaucratic 
collusion, while severe penalty opens the possibility of political collusion.  
Until now, we assumed that monitoring intensity m  is exogenous regardless of 
the action of a politician and a representative voter. We now investigate the change in 
collusion conditions when the politicians or the voter chooses the monitoring intensity m . 
We define politician’s initiative regime as the regime under which the politician decides 
whether to monitor or not and defines voter’s initiative regime as the regime under which 
the voter controls m  and a . Under the politician’s initiative regime, she has an 
additional instrument to realize her private benefit as well as the power to make an effort 
to allow pollution for the firm. Under the voter’s initiative regime, the voter’s objective is 
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to exercise monitoring on bureaucrat and to impose political pressure on politician in 
order to prevent pollution itself.  
 
4. Collusion under politician’s initiative regime 
Figure 3 presents our model’s timeline of political collusion and bureaucratic collusion 
for the politician’s initiative regime. 
Figure 3: Timeline of collusion for politician’s initiative regime 
0 1 2 3 





whether to monitor 
or not 
Firm offers bribe to 
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This second stage of the whole game starts from the decision making of the 
politician whether to monitor or not. In spite of monitoring activity of the politician, the 
bureaucratic collusion is detected with probability m . The probability m reflects the 
productivity of monitoring technology. The difference from the previous exogenous 
monitoring model lies in the fact that detection is possible only if the politician is 
determined to monitor. The firm observes the politician’s decision whether to monitor or 
not and then, decides whether to pollute or not. After the firm is determined to pollute, it 
decides whether to offer bribe the bureaucrat or not. Finally, given the bribe offer by the 
firm, bureaucrat decides whether to accept the bribe or not.  
By using backward induction, we start from the bureaucrat’s decision making. 
When the bureaucrat is involved in the collusion, with probability m , it is detected and 
penalty c  is imposed on the bureaucrat and, with probability 1- m , it is not detected and 
the bureaucrat gets full bribe. Then, the expected payoff of the bureaucrat is “ mcb − ”. 
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Then, the firm will choose the bribe mcb =  and the bureaucrat accepts the bribe. If the 
expected payoff from bribing the bureaucrat, mfbV −− is greater than the payoff 
V without collusion, the firm decides to pollute and bribe the bureaucrat. By anticipating 
the decision making of the firm and the bureaucrat to collude with each other, the 
politician decides to monitor when mP - k  > 0, where P  is the prize given to the 
politician when the politician detects the collusion between the firm and the bureaucrat 
and k is the cost of monitoring. If the expected value of the prize, mP exceeds the 
monitoring cost k , the politician decides to monitor at the initial stage of the second 
subgame. Therefore, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in the second stage of the 
whole game such that the politician decides to monitor the bureaucrat, the firm decides to 
pollute and offers bribe to the bureaucrat, and the bureaucrat accepts the bribe.  
4.1. Prohibitive monitoring cost: mP - k  < 0 
As a trivial case, we need to consider an equilibrium in the second game when 
mP - k  < 0. Since monitoring is too costly, compared with the expected payoff mP , the 
politician abstains from monitoring, then bureaucratic collusion occurs. The politician’s 
initiative regime does not insure political collusion. In this extreme case of prohibitive 
monitoring cost, rather it leads to bureaucratic collusion.  
4.2. Efficient monitoring technology: mP - k  > 0 
Given these equilibrium actions of bureaucratic collusion in the second stage, we 
examine the interaction between the politician and the firm in the first stage of the whole 
game. As we had done in exogenous monitoring, given transfers { 1L , 0L } in the first tage 
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of the game and expected payoff mP - k  in the second stage of the game, the politician 
solves the following problem and chooses her optimal effort level e . 3 
}e{
max e  [ 1L  -  a ] + (1 – e )[L 0  + mP - k ] - 2
2de  
Then, the optimal effort level under the politician initiative is given by  
                     Me  = 
d
kmPaLL )(01 −−−−  




kmPaLL )(01 −−−− )[α - 1L ] + [1 - ( d
kmPaLL )(01 −−−− )][ β - 0L ], 
where α = V  and β = V - )( cfm + . Then, optimal transfer under the politician 
initiative is given by  
ML1  = 2
)( kmPa −++− βα  and ML0 = 0.
4 
By replacing α = V  and β = V - )( cfm + into the expression,  
ML1  = 2
)()( kmPacfm −+++  and ML0 = 0. 
Then, by plugging ML1 and 
ML0 into 
Me , finally we obtain 




)()( −−−+ . 




)( −+ . Comparing 
with e *, we find that the optimal effort of politician under the politician initiative, Me  = 
                                                 
3 The additional term ( mP - k ) is included in the payoff of the politician when her effort failed to change 
the regulation, because the politician can intervene the bureaucratic collusion by exercising monitoring.  
4 The first order condition with respect to ML0 is reduced to -2 <  0. By Kuhn Tucker condition, 





)()( −−−+  is smaller due to the presence of new term mP - k  > 0.  The 
term mP - k  makes ML1  larger than 1L *, the transfer under exogenous monitoring. mP -
k  changes the incentive structure of the politician to make an effort, because the 
politician could get a rent of ( mP - k ) by monitoring the bureaucrat even if she does not 
attempt to make a legislature effort. Then, to induce a legislature effort by the politician, 
a higher compensation is required. This is the reasoning behind the result.  
As the previous section, the political collusion condition under the politician 
initiative is given by  
Me  [α - ML1 ] + (1 - 
Me )[ β - ML0 ]  > β , 
where α = V  and β = V - )( cfm + . By plugging ML1  = 2
)()( kmPacfm −+++ , 
ML0 = 0 and 




)()( −−−+ ,  the political collusion condition is reduced 
to )( cfm +  > a  + ( mP - k ). But, we cannot directly compare it with the prior political 
collusion condition, )( cfm +  > a , since m in )( cfm +  > a  and Mm  in Mm )( cf +  > 
a  + ( PmM - k ) might be different.  To prevent the confusion, let rewrite the political 
collusion condition under the politician initiative as follows.  
Under the restriction of Mm  = m , the political collusion condition becomes 
stricter. However, the lowered possibility of political collusion was accompanied by the 
rent of ( mP - k ) to the politician. The rent given to the politician makes the political 
collusion less attractive for both the politician and the firm. Because the politician still 
holds the opportunity to get a rent in the second stage, the politician exerts less legislature 
effort. To induce the same level of legislature effort, the firm should spend higher transfer 
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to persuade the reluctant politician. The higher required transfer also makes the political 
collusion less attractive to the firm.    
Since the politician earns transfers of ML1  = 2
)()( kmPacfm −+++  through 
political collusion in the first stage of the game and the politician earns ( mP - k ) through 
monitoring in the second stage of the game, we need to check whether it is incentive 
compatible for the politician to accept the transfer ML1  at the first stage of the game. The 
incentive compatible condition to take transfer is ML1 > ( mP - k ) 
2
)()( kmPacfm −+++   >  ( mP - k ) 
is reduced to )( cfm + >  ( mP - k ) - a . We know that )( cfm +  > ( mP - k ) + a  is the 
political collusion that is incentive compatible for the firm. Because ( mP - k ) + a  > 
( mP - k ) - a , when the political collusion condition for the firm is satisfied, the 
incentive compatible condition for the politician to take transfer is always satisfied.  
The condition not to take the transfer ML1  is 2
)()( kmPacfm −+++  < ( mP - k ) 
is reduced to )( cfm +  <  ( mP - k ) - a , which contradicts to )( cfm +  > ( mP - k ) + a , 
political collusion condition in the first stage. Therefore, when the expected payoff of 
monitoring activity in the second stage is larger than the transfer, the political collusion 
does not happen.  
Proposition 5 (transfer to the politician) 
1. The political collusion condition in the politician’s initiative regime is )( cfm +  > 
a  + ( mP - k ), which is stricter than political collusion condition )( cfm +  > a  in 
exogenous monitoring. 
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2. Under the restriction of )( cfm +  > a  + ( mP - k ),  the transfers { ML1  = 
2
)()( kmPacfm −+++ , ML0  = 0} offered by the firm to the politician entails the 




)()( −−−+ , political collusion occurs.  
3. With inefficient monitoring technology, the politician gives up monitoring and 
bureaucratic collusion occurs.  
4. When transfer is not incentive compatible for the politician, ( mP - k ) > ML1 , the 
political collusion does not happen.  
As far as the political collusion condition holds, the transfers are sufficient to 
induce the politician to allow pollution. But, the political collusion is not so attractive to 
the politician as the previous one. To induce the same level of legislature effort, higher 
transfers to the politician are required. With an inefficient monitoring technology, the 
politician gives up monitoring and bureaucratic collusion occurs. The politician’s 
initiative regime does not insure political collusion but rather leads to bureaucratic 
collusion. 
 
5.  Collusion under voter’s initiative regime 
Figure 4 presents our model’s timeline of political collusion and bureaucratic collusion 
for voter’s initiative regime. 
Figure 4: Timeline of collusion for voter’s initiative regime 
0 1 2 3 
Voter chooses monitoring 











The representative voter’s pure interest in monitoring lies in preserving a clean 
environment. The voter does not care about the distribution of the bribe between the 
politician and the bureaucrat. The voter chooses monitoring intensity on the bureaucrat 
and political pressure on the politician at the initial stage of the game to achieve clean 
environment.5 The utility level for the voter from clean environment is denoted by U , 
while the utility level of the voter from polluted environment is U . The difference 
between U  and U  is U∆ .  
The monitoring effort of the voter incurs a cost of )(mC  which is convex in 
monitoring effort. The voter would like to minimize the cost of monitoring. To find out 
the optimal level of the monitoring effort, we examine no collusion condition, because no 
collusion means no pollution.   
5.1. Exogenous level of a  
From the previous discussion, we know that the no-collusion condition V∆  < )( cfm +  
< a  is satisfied when V∆ < a  for the moderate level of monitoring of Mm ∈[ m̂ , m~ ].  
Case A: Efficient monitoring technology of U∆ > )(mC  
Suppose that U∆ > )(mC . Then, the voter would implement the monitoring. Because the 
representative voter seeks to minimize the cost of preventing pollution, it is sufficient to 
choose the monitoring intensity such that the no collusion condition V∆  < )( cfm +  < a  
is satisfied. Then, the optimal monitoring intensity chosen by the voter, given a  is  




∆  + ε  
                                                 
5 The voter’s direct monitoring on the bureaucrat and pressing politician is equivalent to no agency problem 
between the voter and the politician, the bureaucrat. Voter has competence to prevent agency problem.   
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Case B: Prohibitive monitoring cost of U∆ < )(mC  
With prohibitive monitoring cost, U∆ < )(mC , the voter rationally gives up the 
monitoring, and m * = 0 .  
5.2. Exogenous level of m  
In this regime, the voters can also control the politician through political pressure activity 




∆  + ε  when V∆  < a  and m * 
= 0 when the monitoring is so costly. For the outcome to be no pollution, it is sufficient 
for the voter to choose a  such that the no collusion condition is satisfied.  
Case A: Efficient monitoring technology of U∆ > )(aP  
Since the political pressure incurs a cost of )(aP , the voter also seeks to minimize the 




∆ + ε  into the no collusion 




∆ + ε ] )( cf +  < a  is 
obtained. Then, the optimal level of a  is a * = V∆ + ε .  
U∆ > )(aP  
Case B: Prohibitive monitoring cost of U∆ < )(aP  
With prohibitive cost of political pressure, U∆  < )(aP , the optimal level of a  is a * = 0. 
Proposition 6 (optimal control by voters)   
Under the perfect control by the representative voter on the bureaucrat and the politician, 




∆  + ε  and a * = V∆ + ε  when costs of 
exerting political pressure on the politician and monitoring on the bureaucrat are low.  
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But, with prohibitive monitoring cost on the politician and the bureaucrat, political 
pressure m * = 0 and a * = 0.  
We cannot exclude the possibility of collusion under the voter’s initiative regime. 
With costly political pressure and monitoring, the optimal level of a  and m  becomes 
zero, returning back to the situation of bureaucratic collusion or political collusion as we 
have analyzed before.  
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine the conditions under which corruption is observed 
either at the bureaucratic or legislative level. When the political cost is high enough and 
monitoring is very effective, a no-collusion state is likely to be achieved because the high 
political cost disciplines the politician and the efficient monitoring precludes the 
bureaucrat’s from receiving the bribe from the firm. However, when the political cost is 
low, high monitoring only disciplines the bureaucrat, which opens an opportunity for the 
politician and firm to collude with each other. When bureaucrat benefit is high, perfect 
monitoring might not prevent bureaucratic collusion. According to our model, the 
political cost parameter plays a critical role in preventing collusion as well as does 
monitoring intensity.  
In a politician’s initiative regime, the politician decides to monitor bureaucrat 
or not. The politician exerts a legislature effort if the transfer to the politician in the 
first stage of the game outweighs the expected payoffs through monitoring in the 
second stage of the game. If the transfer to the politician in the first stage of the 
game is smaller than the expected payoffs in the second stage of the game, the 
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politician never colludes with the firm in the first stage of the game. No political 
collusion is achieved with a social cost of rents given to the politician. With a 
prohibitive monitoring cost, the politician gives up monitoring, leading to 
bureaucratic collusion. In a voter’s initiative regime, the voter decides the level of 
monitoring on bureaucrats and pressures on politician. No collusion can be obtained 
by choosing the level of monitoring and political control which are related to the 
level of deregulation benefits. Even, in this regime, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of collusion. With a prohibitive monitoring cost and political pressure 
cost, the optimal level of political pressure and monitoring on bureaucrat becomes 
zero, returning back to the situation of bureaucratic collusion or political collusion. 
No collusion state is an exceptional social phenomenon according to our two stages 
model. The two stages model captures the whole process of policy making and its 













Proof: The individual rationality condition for the politician is not binding. 
We assumed that individual rationality condition of politician is not binding at the 
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)( 2−− βα  > 0. Individual rationality condition of politician is not binding at  
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According to Director's Law, “public expenditures are made for the primary benefit of the 
middle class and financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by the poor 
and rich” (Stigler (1970)). The coverage of social welfare programs targeted to low 
income individuals has been expanded to the middle class. Compulsory education, health 
insurance, provision of comprehensive pension schemes, and compensation for the 
unemployed as a social insurance, are examples of policies that end up benefiting the 
middle class. Stigler (1970) suggests that this can be explained by the fact that the middle 
class formed an alliance with the rich in the nineteen century, while in the twentieth 
century they formed a coalition with the poor. The overrepresentation of the middle class 
as the main beneficiaries of the redistributive policies is not limited to the western world. 
In Japan, “social insurance constitutes the core of its policies and the middle class has 
gradually come to enjoy substantial benefits, giving rise to the idea of the welfare state 
for the middle class. The middle class, therefore, is becoming both the beneficiary of the 
welfare state and the backbone of welfare society” (Fujimura (2000)). 
In this paper, we attempt to explain the fact that most redistributive policies are 
typically designed to benefit the middle class using a standard signaling model. The 
middle class, compared with other social groups, seems to be most dynamic sector of the 
society, and very flexible in terms of their political repositioning. It is typically observed 
that the political repositioning of the middle class shows a significant fluctuation, and the 
members of this group are less loyal to political parties. Preferred policies by the middle 
class are more volatile and sometimes ambiguous. One possible explanation is that the 
middle class is, in fact, divided into several subgroups and that the political message they 
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send may not be consistent. This stratification within the middle class will make more 
difficult the observation of the true preferences by the policymaker. 
According to Mule (2001), “to make sense of Director’s Law, it is sufficient to 
note that social groups may change their party allegiances when ruling parties actively 
deploy redistributive policies to manufacture electronic coalitions.” We formalize this 
line of reasoning in order to explain the overrepresentation of the middle class in the 
welfare state, and show that an office seeking policymaker may excessively target 
welfare policies to the middle class in a context of asymmetric information.  
The conflict, coalition, and interaction between social groups have long been 
studied in economics, political science and sociology within various contexts. Politics is a 
field in which voluntary exchanges between political players occur for their own sakes 
and political outcomes are the results of voluntary exchanges. (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962) In this paper, we examine interplay between social groups and a policymaker 
seeking their own private benefits by exchanging votes with policies for special interests.  
Small interests groups are “privileged” in the sense that they can avoid free rider 
problems which are seriously experienced by large interests groups. (Olson, 1971) A 
middle class is a large group which is vulnerable to the free rider problem. Moreover, a 
middle class as a whole is atomized and scattered, not organized as well. In this sense, 
Olson’ arguments are in the opposite side of this paper. Despite of the handicaps a large 
groups may face, a middle class seemed to have successfully benefited from welfare state 
programs. Politician’s effort to buy more supports from voters (i.e., not confined to the 
middle class) solves the dilemma of large groups, contrary to the explanations of Olson’s 
work. The policy entrepreneur and an office seeking policymaker do the jobs for the 
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middle class, leading to increase their probability of being reelected. In a circumstances 
where an office seeking policymaker and policy entrepreneurs manage the political 
process, an implicit allegiance between a middle class and other social groups is formed. 
Through this implicit allegiance, a middle class benefits from the welfare states.  
A policy entrepreneur represents interests of atomized middle class members and 
obtains some political surplus from his activity of organizing the latent interests of the 
middle class. The role of a policy entrepreneur to pick up the latent desires of a social 
group and transmit them to the policymaker, with a profit for himself in translating 
interests of middle class into a political demands (Jones, P. (1978)) According to 
Weingast et al (1981), an economic cost borne by a whole constituent is changed into a 
political benefit for a specific geographical interest. Due to the political representation 
based on geographical constituents, the policy benefits are concentrated on the specific 
areas. This reasoning is extended to the special interest group politics, where benefits 
targeted for the special interest group may be founded on the economic costs spread over 
large constituents. In our paper, the benefits of social welfare program are concentrated 
on the middle class, funded by the poor and the rich.  
The first strand of related literature concerns the study of different pressure 
groups and their influence in the decision making process through voting, campaign 
contributions, and the endorsement of certain candidates. Part of the lobbying game 
literature considers an information problem between interest groups and policymakers. 
They conclude that the interest groups can use their private information to affect the 
policy outcome on their favor (Grossman and Helpman (2001), Lohmann (1995), Austen-
Smith (1993, 1998), Potters and Van Winden (1992), Sloof and Van Winden (2000)). We 
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apply the framework of lobbying games under informational asymmetry to the problem 
of policy determination when there is a conflict between the objectives of different 
income groups.  
When the policy preference of the middle class coincides with the median voters, 
the middle class achieves its ideal policy under majority voting rule. (Downs,1957) 
Parties platforms reflects the middle class preference at the expense of the rich and the 
poor (Dixit et al, (1998)) The median voter theorem provides an explanation of the 
Director’s Law. Our results in this paper are quite similar with the median voter theorem. 
But in this paper, we follow a different approach: focusing on how the allegiance among 
social groups affects the outcome of the political process. The allegiance among social 
groups is implicitly mediated by an office seeking policymaker who is not affected by 
ideological considerations. We show that there exists a conflict of interest between the 
subgroups within the middle class and that a political outcome that may not be preferred 
by median voters can be realized through the implicit formation of internal and external 
allegiance.  
Gavious et al (2003), Dhami (2003), Lohmann (1993) also consider a political 
equilibrium model under information asymmetry using a signaling approach. However, 
our emphasis is on the pooling equilibrium of the model because we think that it can 
explain the bias of the policies toward the middle class. In this equilibrium, both types of 
middle class send the same political message.  
Following the claims by Stigler and Mule on the importance of political groups in 
explaining the overrepresentation of the middle class in the welfare state, we introduce 
two types of allegiance: one is the internal allegiance, within the middle class, and the 
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other is external, i.e. an allegiance with the poor or rich. To capture the external 
allegiance, we consider three social groups: high income class (the rich), low income 
class (the poor) and middle class. The internal allegiance is modeled by assuming that the 
middle class is divided into two subgroups: upper middle class and lower middle class. 
The middle class policy proposal is mediated by policy entrepreneurs. The policymaker 
only cares about reelection.  
This is an important assumption because the preferences of the social groups and 
their political power are mechanically translated into an objective function which drives 
the behavior of the office seeking policymaker. The policymaker receives the message 
sent by the policy entrepreneur of the middle class and chooses her action to minimize 
the associated political cost. Through the policymaker objective function, the middle 
class induces an implicit political support from other social groups. 
 We show that the middle class overrepresentation in the welfare state is a possible 
outcome of our model, which can be explained by an implicit allegiance with other social 
groups. The internal allegiance within the middle class is essential to obtain a pooling 
equilibrium which is robust to the change in the distribution of power in the society. We 
show that there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the policy outcome is close to the 
one desired by the middle class. We explain why a separating equilibrium is not robust 
and argue that it is not attractive for the middle class as a whole. In addition, we elucidate 






Figure 5 presents our basic model’s timeline. 
 
Figure 5: signaling and decision making 
 
Middle class signaling stage Policymaker decision making 
0 1 2 3 
Middle class 
privately observes 
its own type 
Middle class 
proposes policies 
(send a message) 
Policymaker decides 
whether to accept or 
reject the proposal 
Payoffs are realized 
 
The whole game has two stages. At the first stage, the currently adopted policy is 
determined by an elected incumbent policymaker. The adopted policy is observed by all 
players and it constitutes status quo. At the second stage of the game, the middle class 
privately observes its own type. The middle class sends messages (i.e. policy proposals) 
through the mediation of a policy entrepreneur to the incumbent policymaker. It may not 
be realistic for the middle class who is atomized to act collectively. It is assumed that the 
policy entrepreneur organizes the collective action of the middle class costlessly. The 
policymaker accepts or rejects the proposal. The policymaker is an office seeker and only 
cares about minimizing the political cost of her decision. The proportion of upper middle 
class and lower middle class are common knowledge. 
2.1. Policy preference and payoffs 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of ideal policies of social groups on the line [0, 1].  
 





lx′  hx′  hx
(non-interventionism)
  
hx  is the ideal policy for the high income class (the rich), and lx  is the ideal policy for 
the low income class (the poor). hx  and lx  are normalized to 0 and 1 respectively. An 
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economic shock generates two types of middle class, upper middle class and lower 
middle class. hx′  is the ideal policy for the upper middle class and lx′  is the ideal policy for 
the lower middle class. Then, hx = 0  < hx′  <  lx′   < lx  =  1. Payoffs of the middle class 
assume a quadratic form. The ex-post payoffs for the middle class are 
),,( SxxU S
m ′   = - ( x 2)Sx′− , where S ∈  { h , l  }. 
                                        x  = hx′ , when the idea policy of upper middle class is adopted 
                                       x  = lx′ , when the idea policy of upper middle class is adopted 
                                          x  = lx , when both type’s ideal policies are rejected 
The payoffs of both types of middle class when the status quo is lx  and hx  are shown in 
the appendix. The payoffs of the social groups are reflected on the utility function of the 
office seeking policymaker. The function weighs the payoffs of all social groups by their 
corresponding relative political powers. The political power of the social groups are 
denoted by M for the middle, L  for the low, and H for the high income class, 
respectively. The ex-post payoffs for the policymaker are given by 
),,,,( HMLxxV S′   = - p M ( x
2)hx′− - (1- p ) M ( x
2)lx′− - L ( x
2)lx− - H ( x
2)hx− , 
where p  is the proportion of a upper middle class. The payoffs when the status quo is lx  
and hx  are shown in the appendix. Nature determines the two types of middle class. This 
assumption can be justified as follows. A good shock (a higher intellectual ability, talent, 
opportunities, etc.) falls on a proportion p of the middle class, and a bad shock falls on 
the other members of the middle class (with a proportion (1 - p)). The following figure 
shows the game in extensive form. The subgroup experiencing a good shock becomes the  
upper middle class and vice versa for the lower middle class. 
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2.2. Actions of middle class  
The upper middle class (MH) observes its type and sends a message (policy proposal) hx′  
with a probability of α  and lx′  with a probability of (1-α ) at a node of n1. The lower 
middle class sends a message hx′  with a probability of β  and lx′  with a probability of (1-
β ) at a node of n2. Since the members of the middle class expect that they could be rich, 
the lower middle class may send a policy proposal of hx′  (low tax rate). They also 
perceive the importance of social insurance to face bad times, so the higher middle class 
may send a policy proposal lx′  (high expenditure).  Due to hx = 0 < hx′  <  lx′  < lx  = 1, the 
ideal policy of middle class is moderate.  
2.3. Beliefs and decision rules of a policymaker 
Since the proportion of upper middle class is p  (the proportion of lower middle class is 
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1 - p ) and the upper middle class sends a signal hx′  with probability of α  (the lower 
middle class sends a signal hx′  with probability of β ), given the message of hx′ ( lx′ ), the 
policymaker updates her posterior beliefs using Bayes rule. Then, the corresponding 
beliefs for each node are    












−   for {1, 3} 







p  and  







p   for {2, 4} 
At information set {1, 3} of the policymaker, if the expected payoffs of accepting the 
policy proposal hx′  of middle income class exceeds the expected payoffs of rejecting it, 
then the policy proposal hx′  is accepted by the policymaker. Then, the decision rule (i.e. 
policy choice) to accept hx′  is described by the following acceptance condition for hx′ .    
Condition 1: when status quo is lx , acceptance condition for hx′  is given by parameter 
values such that: M [ 1µ ( lx
2)hx′− + 3µ ( lx
2)lx′− ] + H ( lx
2)hx− > M 3µ  ( hx′
2)lx′−  + 
L ( hx′
2)lx− +  H ( hx′
2)hx− .  
Let call the opposite to condition 1 as “rejection condition 1”.  
At information set {2, 4}, the decision rule (i.e. policy choice) to accept lx′  is described 
by the following acceptance condition for lx′ .    
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Condition 2: when status quo is lx , acceptance condition for lx′  is given by parameter 
values such that: M [ 2µ ( lx
2)hx′− + 4µ ( lx
2)lx′− ] + H ( lx
2)hx−  >  M 2µ  
( lx′
2)hx′− + L ( lx′
2)lx− +  H ( lx′
2)hx− .  
Let call the opposite to condition 2 as “rejection condition 2”.  
2.4. Equilibrium concept 
Our objective in this paper is to examine whether there exists a political equilibrium to 
support the overrepresentation of the middle class. The equilibrium concept used in this 
model is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the actions of the upper middle class, 
the lower middle class, and the policymaker are sequentially rational, and are consistent 
with the beliefs of the policymaker. In this model, sequential rationality is easily checked. 
The policymaker is an office seeker. Therefore, she accepts any policy proposal that 
could contribute to a reduction in political costs, given her belief about the type of middle 
class. (i.e., an increase in the probability of the policymaker’s being reelected)  
Given the office seeking policymaker’s decision making, it is sufficient to check 
whether it is incentive compatible for both subgroups in the middle class to send 
messages associated with the type of equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium, both types of 
middle class should have incentive to send the same messages to the policymaker. Since 
the current status quo policy regime is either lx  or hx  and the ideal policies of middle 
class are between these values, deviations from the status quo usually improve the 
welfare of the middle class.  
This conclusion is especially true if the ideal policies of two types of the middle 
class are closely related to each other, then in a pooling equilibrium, both types send the 
same messages and neither is ever worse off due to a given policy change. However, in a 
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separating equilibrium, there remains the possibility of a conflict of interest between the 
two types of middle class.  
Suppose that the ideal policy of the upper middle class has been adopted by the 
policymaker, while the ideal policy of the lower middle class has been rejected. When | hx′  
- lx′ | > | lx′  - lx | and the status quo is lx , the lower middle class is worse off from the 
adoption of hx′ , because adopted policy hx′  is too far away from the ideal policy of the 
lower middle class. The lower middle class, anticipating this result, may be politically 
passive or may actively work against any policy change in the direction of hx′ . A 
separating equilibrium may not exist, since it is not incentive compatible for the lower 
middle class to send lx′  which will be rejected.  
 
3. Analysis  
3.1. Signaling equilibrium when the current status quo policy favors the poor 
In this section, we examine conditions for the existence of policy equilibrium and its 
implication for allegiance between social groups when the status quo redistribution policy 
is lx . In a pooling equilibrium, both types of middle class send the same message to the 
policymaker. The upper middle class and the lower middle class mimic each other, not 
revealing their true types (i.e. true policy preferences). In a separating equilibrium, both 
types of middle class send a message about their ideal policy, revealing true 





(1) Pooling equilibrium 
Consider a pooling equilibrium in which both types of the middle class  send the same 
political message and the corresponding optimal action of for the policymaker is  {reject 
hx′ , accept lx′}. In this instance, the associated Rejection Condition 1 under a pooling 
strategy {α  = 0 , β  = 0 } is  
H ( lx
2)hx− < L ( hx′
2)lx− + H ( hx′
2)hx− , while the associated Acceptance Condition 2 
under the pooling strategy {α  = 0, β  = 0 } is M [ p ( lx
2)hx′− + )1( p− ( lx
2)lx′− ] + 
H ( lx
2)hx−  >  M p ( lx′
2)hx′− + L ( lx′
2)lx− + H ( lx′
2)hx− . Since in this type of 
pooling equilibrium, it is always incentive compatible for both types of the middle class 
to send the same signal,6 the policymaker’s choice {rejects hx′ , accepts lx′}, a pooling 
strategy {α  = 0, β  = 0} and the outcome { lx , lx′} constitute a pooling equilibrium as in 
the following example.  
Numerical Example 1: {α  = 0, β  = 0} and {reject hx′ , accept lx′} 
H  M  L  lx - hx  lx - hx′  hx′ - hx  lx - lx′  lx′ - hx  lx′ - hx′  
1 0.7 3 1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 
 
Recall Rejection Condition 1, “ H ( lx
2)hx− < L ( hx′
2)lx− + H ( hx′
2)hx− ” ,which 
compels the policymaker in rejecting hx′ . LHS represents the political costs to be borne 
by the policymaker when she rejects the proposal, while RHS is the political costs to be 
borne in accepting it. Given the posterior belief, by plugging the parameter values in 
Numerical example 1 into “Rejection Condition 1”, reduces the value  “1 < 1.56”. Since 
                                                 
6 Since the status quo is lx , neither the upper middle class nor the lower middle class is hurt by the policy 
change in the direction of lx′ .  
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hx′  is close to the ideal policy of the rich, the rich support the policy proposal hx′ . In this 
circumstances, the political costs borne by a policymaker in rejecting hx′  are represented 
by the dissatisfaction of the rich (i.e., in this example, the value is 1). Since L  = 3 
outweighs H = 1, political costs borne by the policymaker in accepting hx′ (i.e., in this 
example, the values is 1.56) are larger than 1. Therefore, the optimal action for the 
policymaker is to reject hx′ .  
Plugging the parameter values in Numerical Example 1 into “Ccondition 2”, reduces the 
value to 1.2275 > 0.8715. In this example, in which lx′  is not distant from lx , the policy 
complaints raised by the poor are not large. The political costs to be borne when the 
policymaker accepts the proposal lx′  are not serious. (i.e., in this example, the value is 
0.8715) Therefore, the policymaker’s choice {rejects hx′ , accepts lx′}, given her belief, is 
sequentially rational. As mentioned in the previous section, since lx′  is always closer to 
ideal policies of the upper middle class, it is sequentially rational for the upper middle 
class to send a message of α  = 0. By definition,β  = 0 is the best policy for the lower 
middle class. Actions of {α  = 0, β  = 0} and policy choice action of {rejects hx′ , accepts 
lx′} are sequentially rational.  
From this numerical example, we assert that there exists a pooling equilibrium in 
which both types of middle class send the same signal {α  = 0, β  = 0}, the policymaker 
chooses {reject hx′ , accept lx′}, and equilibrium outcome is { lx , lx′}.  In spite of the 
weak political power of the middle class in the example ( M = 1), the ideal policy lx′  of 
the lower middle class is adopted as a new policy. Both types of middle class is better off, 
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since lx′  is the ideal policy of the lower middle class and lx′  is closer to the ideal policy of 
the upper middle class than the previous status quo policy was, leading to both types 
sending the same political message. The realized policy lx′  in the pooling equilibrium is 
not an ideal policy for the upper middle class. However, the adopted policy lx′  in the 
pooling equilibrium is better than the status quo lx .  
An interesting point of the above numerical example is that as p (the proportion 
of the upper middle class) increases, it helps realize “Acceptance Ccondition 2”. As the 
proportion of the upper middle class increases, the political cost of borne by the 
policymaker in rejecting lx′  also increases. This implies that there is an internal allegiance 
between the subgroups in middle class in the pooling equilibrium. However, this internal 
allegiance is caused by information asymmetry between the policymaker and the middle 
class (i.e., an internal allegiance with the middle class).  
The political cost of rejecting lx′  is overestimated, due to the presence of 
imperfect information, which would have not been taken into account by the policymaker 
under circumstances of complete information. In the policy transition from the status quo 
lx  to policy lx′ , the high income class also plays an important role by supporting lx′ (i.e., 
an external allegiance with the rich).  
Other things being equal, as ( lx′  - hx′ ) is smaller, Acceptance Condition 2 is easily 
satisfied. By sending the same signal with the upper middle class, the lower middle class 
is the most group to benefit most from the policy change. The winners are the middle 
class and the rich. The losers are the low income class.  
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Result 1: The pooling equilibrium {α = 0 , β  = 0} with a moderate policy change in the  
                direction of lx′     
1. There exists a pooling equilibrium to support a policy transition from lx  to lx′  
even if the poor hold predominant political power. 
2. Internal allegiance: The policy transition in the direction of lx′  is unconditionally 
supported by the upper middle class (i.e., no conflict of interest between the 
subgroups within middle class). The increasing p (i.e., the proportion of the upper 
middle class) helps to the realization of Acceptance Condition 2. 
3. External allegiance: The policy transition in the direction of lx′  is also supported 
by the rich.   
Rejection Condition 1 relies on two facts: The strong political power of the poor and a 
too high hx′  bias for the rich. Therefore, by introducing a moderate hx′  and by weakening 
the political power of the poor, we can generate a pooling equilibrium of {α  = 1 and β  
= 1}. Both types send the message of hx′  and the policymaker accepts it. Since the 
political power of the poor is no longer strong, hx′  can be adopted as the new policy. The 
adopted policy hx′  is ideal for the upper middle class and hx′  is welcomed by the rich. 
However,  if hx′  is too far from lx′ , the lower middle class never sends the message hx′ .  
The pooling equilibrium {α  = 1 and β  = 1} requires an internal allegiance condition.  
 
Result 2: The pooling equilibrium {α = 1 , β  = 1} with a drastic policy change  
                towards lx′     
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1. A pooling equilibrium of α  = 1 and β  = 1 exist, when there are small power 
differences between social groups.   
2. Internal allegiance: The policy transition in the direction of hx′  is conditionally 
supported by the lower middle class, only if | hx′  - lx′ | < | lx′  - lx |. 
3. External allegiance: policy transition in the direction of hx′  is unconditionally 
supported by the rich.   
 
(2) Separating equilibrium: α  = 1 and β  = 0 
Case 1: {α = 1, β = 0 } with {accept hx′  and accept lx′ }  
Consider the separating equilibrium in which the upper middle class sends a message of 
hx′ (i.e. α  = 1), while the lower middle class sends a message of lx′ (i.e. β  = 0) and the 
corresponding optimal action of the policymaker is {accept hx′ , accept lx′}. Then, the 
Associated Acceptance Condition 1 under the separating strategy {α  = 1, β  = 0 } is 
M p ( lx
2)hx′−  + H ( lx
2)hx− - H ( hx′
2)hx− > L ( hx′
2)lx− . The associated Acceptance 
Condition 2 under a separating strategy is M (1 - p )( lx
2)lx′−  + H ( lx
2)hx−  - 
H ( lx′
2)hx− > L ( lx′
2)lx− . From Condition 1 and Condition 2, it is straightforward 
conclusion that as L  becomes smaller, the possibility of hx′  and lx′  being accepted 
increases.  
Numerical Example 2  {α  =1, β  = 0 } with {accept hx′ , accept lx′} 
H  M  L  lx - hx  lx - hx′  hx′ - hx  lx - lx′  lx′ - hx  lx′ - hx′  
1 0.7 1.2 1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 
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Given the posterior belief, plugging parameter values in Numerical Example 2 into 
Condition 1, reduces the value to 1.555 > 0.588. In this example, the power differences 
between L  and H  are negligible. In this case, the political costs of rejecting hx′  
outweigh the political costs of accepting hx′ . Therefore, the optimal response of the 
policymaker is to accept hx′ .  
Plugging parameter values in Numerical Example 2 into Condition 1, reduces the 
value to 1.555 > 0.588. With the small power differences between social groups in this 
example, the political costs of rejecting lx′  outweighs the political costs of accepting lx′ . 
In this case, the optimal response of the policymaker is to accept lx′ . Therefore, the 
policymaker’s choice {accept hx′ , accept lx′}, given her belief, is sequentially rational. 
Since hx′  and lx′  are ideal policies for each subgroup of the middle class, by definition. 
{α  = 1 (proposing hx′ ),  and β  = 0 (proposing lx′ )} are sequentially rational.  
There exists a separating equilibrium such that the policymaker’s choice {accept 
hx′ , accept lx′}, the separating strategy {α  = 1, β  = 0} and outcome { hx′ , lx′} constitute 
an equilibrium. However, in order to support a separating equilibrium, it is requirement  
that political power differences between the social groups be negligible to support a 
separating equilibrium. When L is highly dominant over H and M , a separating strategy 
by the middle class cannot induce policy change, while a pooling strategy could invoke 
policy change, despite the substantial power differences among the social groups (e.g., 
Example 1).  
If the restriction on power differences is satisfied, in spite of the relatively weak 
political power of the middle class, the ideal policies of both types of the middle class are 
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adopted. The internal allegiance condition | hx′  - lx′ | < | lx′  - lx | is not required, because 
two types of middle class need not cooperate with each other in sending messages. Rather, 
this separating equilibrium includes the possibility of conflicts of interest between the 
upper middle class and the lower middle class. This possibility for conflict of interests is 
dealt with as follows in Case 2.  
 
Result 3: The separating equilibrium of {α  = 1, β  = 0} with {accept hx′ , accept lx′} 
1. The existence of the separating equilibrium of {α  = 1, β  = 0} with {accept hx′ , 
accept lx′} is supported by the small power differences between the social groups. 
2. External allegiance: The policy transition toward hx′  or lx′  is unconditionally  
supported by the rich.   
When the political power differences between social groups are small, each class may 
regard itself as decisive group in determining policies. In the separating equilibrium, the 
middle class may lack any incentive to have internal allegiance within the class. Since the  
separating equilibrium is supported by the small political power differences, the upper 
middle class (or the lower middle class) has an incentive to have an external allegiance 
with the rich (or the poor). We are looking for the possibility of these conflicts of interest 
within the subgroups in Case 2.  
Case 2: {α = 1, β = 0 } and {accept hx′  and reject lx′ }  
According to Condition 1 and Condition 2, the implication is that as p  increases, 
the possibility of hx′  being adopted increases and the possibility of lx′  being adopted 
decreases. In a pooling equilibrium, the possibility of lx′  being adopted increased in p . 
 56
With a high value of p , Condition 1 is easily satisfied while Condition 2 may be harder 
to satisfy. As p  increases, the political cost of rejecting lx′  becomes smaller. The value of 
p  affects the final decision of the policymaker and introduces different type of 
separating equilibrium to be discussed here.  
In this type of separating equilibrium, the higher proportion of the upper middle 
class (i.e., a higher p ) may prohibit the realization of the ideal policy for the lower 
middle class, since lx′  is easily rejected, which implies, that the remaining subgroup (1- 
p ) may be excluded from the policy setting procedure. The ideal policy for the lower 
middle class is rejected and only the ideal policy for the upper middle class is considered 
by the policymaker. In a separating equilibrium, true types of subgroups in the middle 
class are revealed, the policymaker cares only about the policy proposal of the politically 
important subgroup (i.e., the upper middle class when p  is high). The minority subgroup 
(1- p ) is politically segregated.  
Whether the adoption of the ideal policy for the upper middle class improves the 
welfare of the lower middle class is uncertain. If the ideal policy for the upper middle 
class is closer to the ideal policy for the lower middle class, its adoption may constitute 
welfare improvement for the lower middle class, despite the fact that the political 
participation of the minority subgroup is excluded. Especially if lx′  is distant from hx′ , the 
welfare of the lower middle class may be worse off due to the policy change towards hx′ .  
If lx′  is substantially distant from hx′ , then the lower middle class and the upper 
middle class should be categorized as different social groups. In this case, the lower 
middle class would be similar to the poor. This type of separating equilibrium shows the 
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existence of a conflict of interest within the middle class. In the pooling equilibrium of 
{α = 1, β = 0}, the interests of the upper and lower middle class were aligned. In the 
separating equilibrium of {α = 1, β = 0} with {accept hx′  and reject lx′ }, as p  increases 
and | hx′  - lx′ | becomes bigger, conflicts of interests within middle class occur.  
As a concluding remark in this section, we evaluate welfare impact on the social 
groups under the separating equilibrium.  In a separating equilibrium in Case 1, the 
welfare of both types of middle class improves. In this situation, the loser is the poor. In 
the separating equilibrium of Case 2, the welfare of the upper middle class improves. The 
rich benefit from any policy change in the direction of hx′  in either case. If hx′  is distant 
from lx′ , the losers are the lower middle class and the poor. In both cases, hx′  is chosen, 
which makes the rich be winners.  
 
Result 4: The separating equilibrium {α  = 1, β  = 0} with {accept hx′ , reject lx′ }  
1. As the proportion of the upper middle ( p ) increases, the probability that the ideal 
policy of the remaining subgroup (1 - p ) is rejected increases.  
2. Internal allegiance: as p  and | hx′  - lx′ | increase, a conflict of interest occurs 
between the subgroups. When | hx′  - lx′ | >  | lx′  - lx |, the lower middle class is 
worse off.  
3. External allegiance: The policy transition toward hx′  is unconditionally supported 




3.2. Equilibrium when the status quo policy is for the rich 
In this section, we examine conditions for the existence of policy equilibrium and its 
implication for allegiance between social groups when the status quo redistribution policy 
is hx . The corresponding acceptance conditions are as follows:  
Condition 3: the acceptance condition for hx′ when status quo is hx is given by parameter 
values such that: M [ 1µ ( hx
2)hx′− + 3µ  ( hx
2)lx′− ] + L ( hx
2)lx−   
> M 3µ  ( hx′
2)lx′− + L ( hx′
2)lx− + H ( hx′
2)hx− . In opposition to “Condition 3,” this 
situation is called by Rejection Condition 3. 
Condition 4: The acceptance condition for lx′  when the status quo is hx  is given by 
parameter values such that: M [ 2µ ( hx
2)hx′−  + 4µ ( hx
2)lx′− ] + L ( hx
2)lx−  >  M 2µ  
( lx′
2)hx′− + L ( lx′
2)lx− + H ( lx′
2)hx− .In opposition to “Condition 4,” this situation is 
called by Rejection Condition 4.  
 
(1) Pooling equilibrium  
Case 1: α  = 1 and β  = 1 
When the pooling strategy {α  = 1, β  = 1} is chosen by the middle class, the associated 
Acceptance  Condition 3 for hx′  is M [ p ( hx
2)hx′− +(1 - p )( hx
2)lx′− ] + L ( hx
2)lx−  >  
M p ( hx′
2)lx′− + L ( hx′
2)lx− + H ( hx′
2)hx− and the associated Rejection Condition 4 for 
lx′  is L ( hx
2)lx−  < L ( lx′
2)lx− + H ( lx′
2)hx− .  
Numerical Example 3  α  = 1 and β  = 1 
H  M  L  lx - hx  lx - hx′  hx′ - hx  lx - lx′  lx′ - hx  lx′ - hx′  
3 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.1 
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Given the posterior belief, plugging the parameter values in Numerical Example 3 into 
Condition 3, reduces the value to 1.1525 > 1.0025. In this example, because hx′  is a 
moderate policy change and the political cost of rejecting it outweighs the dissatisfaction 
of the rich, the policymaker accepts hx′ . Given the posterior belief, plugging the 
parameter values in Numerical Example 3 into Rejection Condition 4, reduces the value 
to 1.1 <  1.24. In this example, H  is politically dominant and lx′  is too drastic a policy 
change; therefore, the policymaker rejects lx′ . In this case, the associated Acceptance 
Condition 3 and the associated Rejection Condition 4 are satisfied. From this example, 
{α  = 1, β  = 1} and {accept, reject} and { hx′ , hx } constitute a pooling equilibrium 
outcome.  
 
Result 5: {α  = 1, β  = 1} with a moderate policy change 
1. There exists a pooling equilibrium, the policy change towards hx′ (i.e. a moderate 
policy change), despite the weak political power of the middle class. 
2. Internal allegiance: the policy transition towards hx′  is unconditionally supported 
by the lower middle class.  
3. External allegiance: the policy transition towards hx′  is unconditionally supported 
by the poor.   
Case 2: α  = 0 and β  = 0 
As with the case in which the status quo is lx , we need to check whether it is incentive 
compatible for the upper middle class to send the message, lx′ , which implies a drastic 
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policy change. If | hx′  - lx′ | >  | hx′  - hx |, the upper middle class never sends the same 
message as the lower middle class.  
 
Result 6: {α  = 1, β  = 1} with a drastic policy change 
1. There exists a pooling equilibrium, the policy change towards lx′  (i.e. an extreme  
policy change) by accompanied by the restriction of | hx′  - lx′ | < | hx′  - hx |.  
2. External allegiance: the policy transition towards lx′  is unconditionally supported 
by the poor.   
 
(2) Separating equilibrium: α  = 1 and β  = 0 
Case 1: {α  = 1, β  = 0} and {accept, accept }  
When a separating strategy {α  = 1, β  = 0} is chosen by the middle class, the associated 
Acceptance Ccondition 3 for hx′  is M p ( hx
2)hx′−  + L ( hx
2)lx−  >  
L ( hx′
2)lx− + H ( hx′
2)hx− and the associated Acceptance Ccondition 4 for lx′  is M (1 -
p )( hx
2)hx′− + L ( hx
2)lx−  > L ( lx′
2)lx− + H ( lx′
2)hx− . In spite of the weak political 
power of the middle class, its ideal policy { hx′ , lx′} is adopted in both states. However, to 
induce a separating equilibrium, we need a stronger restriction on the political power 
distribution between the social groups, as the following example indicates.  
Numerical Example 4  {α  = 1, β  = 0} and {accept, accept } 
H  M  L  lx - hx  lx - hx′  hx′ - hx  lx - lx′  lx′ - hx  lx′ - hx′  
3 0.7 2 1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 
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By plugging the parameter values in Numerical Example 4 into Condition 3 and 
Condition 4, the values are reduced to 1.555 > 2.0315 and 2.0315 > 1.4 respectively. 
Since ( hx′ - hx ) is small, the degree of opposition of the rich is mitigated. Then, the 
policymaker accepts hx′ . The combined the opposition of the poor and the upper middle 
class against the current status quo compels the policymaker to accept lx′ . As p  
increases, Acceptance Condition 3 is easily satisfied; however, Acceptance Condition 4 is 
harder to satisfy. As p  grows, the political cost of rejecting lx′  becomes smaller, leading 
to the following types of separating equilibrium.  
Case 2: {α  = 1, β  = 0} and {accept, reject} 
In a separating equilibrium, with a high value of p , the ideal policy for the lower 
middle class is rejected, and only the ideal policy for the upper middle class is accepted. 
The higher proportion of the upper middle class may prohibit the realization of the ideal 
policy for the lower middle class. The welfare level of the upper middle class improves. 
While the poor are better off, the rich are the losers.  
 
Result 7:  a separating equilibrium of {α  = 1, β  = 0} and {accept, reject} 
1. As the proportion of the upper middle ( p ) increases, the probability that the ideal 
policy of the remaining subgroup (1 - p ) is rejected increases.  
2. Regardless of the current status quo (i.e. lx′  or hx′ ), in a type of separating 
equilibrium of {α = 1, β = 0} and {accept, reject}, there exists a conflict of 
interest between subgroups within the middle class.  
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3. As p  and | hx′  - lx′ | increase, the welfare of a minor subgroup (i.e., lower middle 
class) worsens.  
 
4. Conclusion  
The “Director’s Law” is consistent with the standard median voter theorem. However, 
our paper asserts that the middle class overrepresentation in the welfare state is deeply 
related to the implicit allegiance with other social groups. We also assume that the middle 
class consists of two subgroups, and upper middle class and a lower middle class. The 
internal allegiances within the middle class have not been addressed before. When the 
upper middle class and the lower middle class articulate the same political messages to 
the policymaker, the middle class obtains its ideal policy if it pursues a moderate policy 
change from the current status quo.  
This allegiance, within the middle class, is captured by the pooling equilibrium of 
the model. We showed that there exists a pooling equilibrium which supports policy 
change toward the ideal policy of the middle class. This pooling equilibrium is robust in 
the sense that even if the differences between political powers are significant, an 
equilibrium which benefits the middle class exists. In the case of an important policy 
change, a conflict of interest between the upper and lower middle class may arise. This 
conflict is avoided if the ideal policies of the two subgroups are very close.  
A separating equilibrium where the ideal policies of the upper middle class are 
adopted exists if the differences in political power between social groups are small. It is 
interesting to note that in a separating equilibrium as the proportion of the upper middle 
class increases, the probability of rejecting the proposal of the lower middle increases. If 
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the policy change is substantial, a separating equilibrium is not robust, it may increase the 
divergence within the middle class, and weaken the political power of the middle class. 
Policy transition toward hx′  or lx′  is unconditionally supported by the rich or the poor. 
According to our model, the middle class achieves its ideal policy through the internal 
allegiance and outside support from the poor or the rich. But, the degree of policy change 
should be moderate, because drastic policy changes may generate a conflict of interests 




1. Ex-post payoffs of middle class when status quo is lx  
 
 - ( hx′
2)hx′− , where proposed policy hx′  is adopted in S  = G  and status quo is lx  
 
 - ( lx
2)hx′− , where proposed policy  hx′  is rejected in S  = G  and status quo is lx  
 - ( lx′
2)hx′− , where proposed policy lx′  is adopted in S  = G  and status quo is lx  
 - ( lx
2)hx′− , where proposed policy lx′  is rejected in S  = G  and status quo is lx  
 - ( hx′
2)lx′− , where proposed policy hx′  is adopted in S  = B  and status quo is lx  
 - ( lx
2)lx′− , where proposed policy hx′  is rejected in S  = B  and status quo is lx  
 - ( lx′
2)lx′− , where proposed policy lx′  is adopted in S  = B  and status quo is lx  
 - ( lx
2)lx′− , where proposed policy lx′  is rejected in S  = B  and status quo is lx  
 
 
2. Ex-post payoffs of politician when status quo is lx  
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2)hx− , where proposed policy lx′  is rejected  
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3. Ex-post payoffs of politician when status quo is hx  
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If a corporation has business activities located in multiple jurisdictions, then the local 
authority can levy a tax on income generated in that state. However, as measuring income 
earned within each jurisdiction presents a difficult conceptual problem, a system of 
formula apportionment to allocate income across states is usually adopted. Formula 
apportionment, as used in the U.S., asserts that the proportion of a multi-state firm’s 
income earned in a given state is a weighted average of the proportion of the firm’s total 
sales, property, and payroll in that state. Specifically, the tax due by a multi-state firm to 
















⎡ ++= , 
where iK , iW  and iS  are property, payroll, and sales in state i, respectively; K, W, 
and S are total domestic property, payroll, and sales of the firm respectively; ijm  is the 
weight given to factor j in the apportionment formula in state i; Tiπ  represents total 
profits of the multi-state firm as defined by state i’s tax law; and it is state i’s tax rate. 
Table 1 shows the weights ijm  chosen by different states in the US. In general, states do 
not follow a single principle. If they all adopt the same apportionment formula, exactly 
100 percent of a corporation’s income will be apportioned across states. Non-uniformity, 
however, can result in more or less than 100 percent of a corporation’s income being 
subject to state income tax.  
In an effort to encourage tax uniformity, the Multi-state Tax Compact in 1967 
established that the three factors considered in the apportionment formula are to be 
weighted equally. In spite of the compact, most states have recently deviated from the 
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uniform formula apportionment and moved towards a greater weight on the sales portion 
of the corporate income tax, as it is clear from Table 1. It has been claimed that by 
manipulating the formula in this way, officials can offer tax breaks that help the 
economic development of the region. If more states pass such legislation, other states will 
be compelled to do the same, initiating a “race to the bottom”, in which all states end up 
imposing the same (lower) tax liability.  
The choice of the specific formula apportionment is an avenue through which tax 
competition between state governments occurs. The apportionment of a firm’s total 
profits across states creates complicated incentive effects. On one hand, firms operating 
in different regions will react to different formula by changing the allocation of property, 
of sales and of workers across regions. On the other hand, given that the tax policy 
selected by different state governments affects residents of other states, some kind of 
strategic interaction can be expected. 7 
Separating accounting is an alternative for formula apportionment. According to 
Pethig and Wagner (2003), “In the European Union, it is worried that the investment 
across the member countries is heavily taxed due to the member country’s uncoordinated 
tax scheme. Current separating accounting system requires the firm to set up the profit 
center for each member countries, incurring high monitoring cost of tax authority and 
high compliance cost of the firm who have to deal with. This induces firm’s investment 
shift from high tax region to low tax region.” Under separating accounting system, there 
is no way for individual tax authorities to have comprehensive information about the 
                                                 
7 Wall Street Journal, February 14 2001, reports, “Proponents say the single sales factor is good for the economic 
growth because it eliminates the disincentive to corporate investment inherent in the traditional formula. But there is a 
dark side to these gains. Everyone is racing to get there first, but once everybody gets there, the benefits go away.”  
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overall activities of the firm, as the real profit of each subsidiary in each nation is 
distorted by the transfer pricing policy of the multinational firm across the border. Since 
the cost of the transfer pricing between subsidiaries and the headquarter of the 
multinational firm cannot be exactly observed, the multinational firm has strong 
incentives to manipulate the transfer pricing which affects the tax base. Anticipating this 
strategic behavior of the firm, the tax authorities spend higher cost for monitoring. 
Compliance cost of the firm might be huge. Since the multinational firm in EU should 
deal with different tax schemes for its member countries, the firms are reluctant to invest 
in different member countries and concentrate their investment in the lower tax rate zone. 
Separating accounting may induce this kind of tax competition which is contrary to the 
objective of EU. As the EU economy becomes integrated, in order to deal with tax 
coordination and tax competition, the experience of the US in formula apportionment 
invokes interest in EU countries.  
The literature about formula apportionment is closely related to the corresponding 
literature that examines the relationship between national tax systems and the strategic 
decisions on the part of multinational enterprises concerning the location of their 
investment, production and profits in particular, the allocation of foreign direct 
investment across countries.  
The present paper extends the formula apportionment literature by considering the 
effect of different formulas on the equilibrium tax rate and the provision of local goods. 
The model assumes that the strategic determination of the corporate tax rates by local 
authorities affects the localization of a multi-jurisdictional firm’s activities. Given the 
complicated incentive effects generated by this tax system, the model analyzes the 
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outcome of a symmetric equilibrium. The paper concludes that due to the strategic 
interaction between local governments, the equilibrium tax rate is inefficiently low, 
which might cause underprovision of the public good. In addition, the inefficiency is 
more severe in a formula apportionment that employs capital shares as a measure of the 
firms’ activities in each state, compared to output (or sales) shares. As a result, the shift 
towards a (symmetric) formula apportionment under output (sales) shares constitutes an 
improvement for the economy.8  
Even though there seems to be a great interest in the US and the EU in the 
strategic modification of apportionment formulas among state governments (Nielsen et al. 
2000), only recently has this issue been formally examined. The earlier papers by 
McClure (1980) and McClure (1981) first elucidated that formula apportionment mostly 
transforms the state corporate income tax into three separate taxes on the factors in the 
apportionment formula. Anand and Sansing (2000) provide an explanation for why states 
choose different apportionment formula, even though aggregate social welfare is 
maximized when states use the same formula. They demonstrate analytically that 
“importing” states have incentives to increase sales factor weights, while “exporting” 
states have incentives to reduce the weights on productive factors. Our analysis shows 
that capital outflow is less sensitive under output shares formula apportionment than 
capital shares formula apportionment.  
Gordon and Wilson (1986) examine the response of firms to a system of formula 
apportionment, restricting attention to cases in which all states use the same system, with 
different corporate tax rates. Their paper shows that the public good is underprovided and 
                                                 
8 “State corporate income taxes raised $32 billion in 2001, accounting for just 5.7 percent of state tax revenues and 2.7 
percent of total state revenues. These shares have declined since the late 1970s” (Edwards, 2004) 
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the utility level is lower under a formula apportionment system compared to property 
taxation. We obtain a similar result, but the main difference is that we also find that the 
inefficiency is more severe under a formula apportionment that exclusively considers 
capital shares relative to one that only employs sales shares, leading to a lower level of 
welfare in the regions. As a result, a transition towards a formula apportionment that 
gives more importance to the sales proportion (which is consistent with the evidence 
from US) might constitute a welfare improvement for the economy as a whole.  
Goolsbee et al (2000) provides empirical support to the fact that a change of the 
formula apportionment creates negative externalities on other states, “creating pressure 
for states to act first in changing their formulae”. Edmiston (2002) finds that single-factor 
sales policies have positive effects on the economic development. Our paper explicitly 
considers the negative externalities created by the strategic determination of the corporate 
tax rates and shows that MRS between the private good and the publicly provided local 
good under formula apportionment at federal government level is lower than MRS under 




2. 1. Outline of the game between the local government and the multi state firm 
There are two regions: region 1 and region 2. Each one is inhabited by a representative 
consumer and a local government. A multi-state firm operates in both regions at the same 
time. The technology is described by an increasing and strictly concave production 
function f(k), where capital is the only input. Capital can be rented in a perfectly 
competitive capital market at price r. Figure 8 describes the sequence of events in our 
model. 
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Figure 8: FA policy and reaction of multistate firm  
 
0 1 2 
Local governments announce FA 
and corporate income tax rates 
Firm observes the tax policy and 
allocates capital across regions 
Payoffs are realized 
 
In the first stage, the local government announces its corporate income tax rate 
and the formula apportionment. The tax revenue is entirely used to finance the publicly 
provided local good. At the second stage of the game, after observing the tax rate and 
apportionment formula, the multi-state firm chooses its optimal level of capital in each 
region. The decisions made by the firm at the second stage of the game are rationally 
anticipated by the local government. The sub-game perfect equilibrium depends on the 
apportionment formula and tax rates chosen by the local governments, and the allocation 
of capital across regions. In order to derive the equilibrium conditions, we first need to 
investigate the firm’s reaction to different tax rates. Due to the complexity of the analysis, 
we focus in a symmetric equilibrium. 
 
2.2. Firm’s profit maximization 
The production function f(ki), i = 1,2,  is strictly concave and identical in both regions, r  
is the cost of capital, and 1t  and 2t are the corporate income tax rates levied in each region. 
Following Pethig et al (2003), we denote α ( 1k , 2k ) the firm’s activities in region 1, and 
β ( 1k , 2k ) the firm’s activities in region 2. The effective tax rate faced by the firm is 
given by t  = 1t α ( 1k , 2k ) + 2t β ( 1k , 2k ). Corporate income tax deduction is applied to 
the cost of capital financed from capital markets with the degree of µ  (see, for instance 
Wilson (1986)). We assume that both local governments adopt the same deduction policy 
µ . Most existing tax systems permit only incomplete deduction of capital costs. This 
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corresponds to µ < 1, which means that a positive tax is also levied on capital. For µ = 1, 
the corporate tax falls only on pure profits, and when µ > 1 capital is subsidized. The 
multi-state firm solves the following problem. It maximizes profits by choosing 1k  and  
2k , given the tax rate, the formula apportionment, and the deduction policy imposed by 
the local governments: 
21 k,k
max   V( 1k , 2k ; 1t , 2t ,µ ) = [(1- t )π - t (1-µ ) k r ], where π = ])()([ 2211 rkkfrkkf −+− .                               
 
From the FOCs, the following expressions are obtained in a symmetric equilibrium (i.e. t1 
= t2):  
[ f ′ ( 1k ) – r ] = t
t
−1
(1 - µ ) r  and  [ f ′ ( 2k ) – r ] = t
t
−1
(1 - µ ) r . 
Due to the presence of the deduction policyµ , even in the symmetric equilibrium there is 
still a distortion in the capital allocation across regions. We can now derive the reaction 
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∂β .  
Result 1: When the local government employs exclusively a formula that only weighs 
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− µ >  π . 
 
An increase in the tax rate under a full capital share formula apportionment 
induces capital to leave the region. However, it is uncertain whether an increase in the tax 
rate of region 1 benefits the neighboring region. A positive externality to region 2 is 












∂  is always positive9, and if µ  < 1, 












∂  is always negative. For example, 












∂  < 0.  In this case of negative net profits, 
the increase of tax rate in region 1 decreases capital investment in region 2 as well as in 
region 1. In the case of zero profits, the increase of tax rate in region 1 does not create a 
positive externality in capital investment in region 2. Disregarding those exceptional 
cases of negative net profits and zero profits, we can claim that the capital outflow toward 
a neighboring region is caused by the increase in the tax rate of the region, creating an 
                                                 




















πα   >  0. 
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∂  > 
0 become the foundation of the tax competition between state governments.  
 
Result 2: When the local government employs exclusively a formula that only weighs 
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An increase in the tax rate under a formula apportionment that exclusively considers the 
proportion of sales in the region induces capital to leave the region, as with a formula that 
only weighs capital shares. It is also uncertain whether an increase in the tax rate of 






2.3. State government problem with formula apportionment 
The representative resident’s welfare is determined by the level of the publicly provided 
local good and private consumption good. We assume that the welfare function is 
identical across regions. Corporate income taxes are used to finance the state 
government’s expenditure. We assume that a balanced budget constraint is maintained. 
The private good consumption is given by an exogenously predetermined share (θ ) of 
the net total profit of the multi-state firm. Then, the state government of region 1 solves 
the following problem: 
1t
max U( 1g , 1x ),  
where 1g  =  1t k
k1 [π  + (1 - µ ) k r ]  =  1t  α ( 1k , 2k )[π  + (1 - µ ) k r ], 1x  = θ [(1 - t )π  
- t (1 - µ ) k r ], and π = ])()([ 2211 rkkfrkkf −+− .  
At a symmetric equilibrium,  
























∂ ) 2 ], 
and the level of g1 is determined by:  

























     (7) 
The MRS includes both the reaction of the firm to the tax policy (which is the main 
source of tax competition between local governments), and the shape of production 
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technology. It is straightforward to show that efficiency requires that MRS = 1.10 
Therefore, MRS > 1 implies that the tax rate is inefficiently low compared to the efficient 
level. 
 


























               If γ  > 2 and θ  = 0.5, then MRS > 1 taxes are inefficiently low at a symmetric  
              equilibrium.  
This welfare loss condition holds for both types of formula apportionment considered in 
this paper, i.e. a formula apportionment that only weighs capital shares and a formula 
apportionment that only considers sales shares. Let θ  = 0.5 and γ  is larger than 2. Given 
θ = 0.5, γ  > 2 implies that reactions of the multistate firm to the change in tax rate are 
sensitive at the capital investment level within a specific type of formula apportionment.  
Reactions of the multistate firm are key determinants of γ . As result 1 and result 2 
indicates, the multistate firm’s reaction at the symmetric equilibrium are different by a 
formula apportionment policy.  
Therefore, we can conclude that different formula apportionment policies (i.e. 
capital shares vs sales shares) adopted by state governments in U.S. induce different 
                                                 
10  Let 1t , 2t  solve the following problem: max U( 1g , 1x ) + U( 2g , 2x ), where 1x  + 2x  + 1g  + 2g   =  




































= [ f ′ ( 1k ) – r], we obtain MRS  =  1. At the efficient level of tax rate, MRS = 1, so that if MRS > 1, 
1t , and 2t  would be inefficiently low. 
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welfare impacts on the regions including their neighboring regions.  As far as γ  > 2, 
regardless of formula apportionment policies, the states experience welfare loss. Since 












∂  can be interpreted as the degree of tax competition 
between the local governments, as these expressions become larger, or alternatively when 
capital becomes responsive to changes in the tax rates, the regions experience larger 












∂  are different according to formula apportionment policies, the welfare level of 
regions is relied on two factors; the degree of tax competition and formula apportionment 
policies including tax policy adopted by neighboring regions.  
In the first part of next section, we analyze the welfare impact relying on the 
different formula apportionment policies. Tax competition and formula apportionment 
policy in a region generate externalities to neighboring regions. If a federal government 
implements formula apportionment rule, then externalities can be internalized. In the 
second part of next section, we compare the welfare impact of FA managed by a state 
government with the welfare impact of FA managed by a federal government.  
 
3. Analysis   
3. 1. Comparison output shares and capital shares formula apportionment. 
Our objective is to compare the welfare effect of an equally weighted three-factor 
formula with a formula that exclusively considers capital or sales shares. A three-factor 
equally weighted formula apportionment is a convex combination of a formula that only 
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considers the sales, the capital and the wage factor. Since the firm produces its output by 
using capital and labor, the capital and the wage factor in the formula apportionment can 
be grouped in a single category. To compare the welfare impact, we calculate MRS FA  
under an output (sales) share formula apportionment and MRS FA  under a capital share 
formula apportionment respectively.11  












∂ . These expressions 






∂ | k be the reaction 






∂ | f be the reaction under output share. Due to decreasing 
























∂ | f  in absolute value, respectively. The proof is provided in the Appendix. In addition, 
note that if MRS fFA  > 1, then MRS
k
FA  > 1, i.e., MRS
k
FA  > MRS
f
FA  > 1. This result states 
that if tax rates are inefficiently low when regions employ a formula apportionment based 
exclusively on sales shares, then the distortion will be more important under a formula 
apportionment that only weighs capital shares. Under output shares, a change in the tax 
rate affects investment decisions through the production technology. But, the production 
function is strictly concave, this concavity smoothes the impact of the change in the tax 
rate. Under capital shares, the change in the tax rate directly affects the allocation of 
capital. Hence, the local government will experience a serious capital outflow to the 
neighboring region. This result can be summarized as follows. 
                                                 
11 At a symmetric equilibrium, output and sales are identical. 
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Result 4: MRS kFA  = θ γ k  > MRS
f
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∂ | f . Then, if MRS fFA  = θ γ f > 1, a formula 
apportionment that only weighs sales shares provides a higher welfare level relative to 
one that exclusively weighs capital shares. 
As a result, the shift toward a formula apportionment under output shares 
constitutes an improvement for the economy as a whole. This is because capital becomes 
less responsive to changes in tax rates when output shares are used as opposed to capital 
shares. A lower response under output shares, implies that tax rates will not be as low as 
in the case of capital shares. A formula apportionment that gives equal weights to capital 
and output is a convex combination of the latter two cases. Then, the Multi-state Tax 

















equilibrium, is a convex combination of MRS kFA  and MRS
f
FA , we have that: 








 > MRS fFA                                                                       (8) 
This last relationship is consistent with a deviation from the Multi-state Tax Compact in 
1967 towards a formula that exclusively weighs the sales portion. 
The corporate income tax under a formula apportionment system can be 
decomposed into three separate taxes on the each factor (McClure, 1980). As the output 
share increases, the corporate income tax under formula apportionment approaches a pure 














∂ | f . By assigning a higher weight to the sales factor, the local government 
actually imposes a kind of sales tax on the firm rather than a property tax.  As the sales 
factor is weighed more heavily, the effective tax rate imposed on capital becomes smaller. 
Hence, the capital outflow is smaller in this case relative to a formula that gives a higher 
weight to the capital factor.  
3.2. Comparison local formula apportionment and cooperative formula 
apportionment 
In the previous section, we showed that under sales share, the tax rates are not as low as 
in the case of capital shares. In this section, we examine whether the cooperative formula 
apportionment between the local governments improves the welfare of the economy as a 
whole. 12 Let us denote MRS under local government by MRS localFA and MRS under 
cooperative formula apportionment by MRS coopFA . The cooperative optimal solution of the 
tax rate is given by solving the following problem:  
21 t,t
max  U( 1g , 1x ) + U( 2g , 2x ) 
subject to  1g  =  1t  α ( 1k , 2k )[π  + (1 - µ ) k r ], 2g  =  2t β ( 1k , 2k ) [π  + (1 - µ ) k r ], 
1x  = θ [(1 - t )π  - t (1 - µ ) k r ], and 2x  = (1 - θ )[(1 - t )π  - t (1 - µ ) k r ], where π = 
])()([ 2211 rkkfrkkf −+− .                      
The MRS between the publicly provided local good and the private good under capital 
share under the cooperative formula apportionment is described in the following result.  
                                                 
12 “Cooperative formula apportionment” is one in which local governments make an enforceable agreement 
on formula apportionment to be implemented and execute it without betrayal.   
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Result 5: MRS coopFA  = θ γ










































Proof: See the appendix. 
The main difference between a cooperative formula apportionment and a formula 
apportionment implemented by the local governments is that the cooperative formula 
apportionment can internalize the negative externality created by the tax competition. In 
deriving equation result 5, we used such way of internalization that marginal utility from 
the public good in region 1 is equal to marginal utility from the public good in region 2. 
By comparing γ k  in equation result 4 with γ coop  in equation result 5, we obtain the 
following condition. 
 
Result 6: MRS localFA  > MRS
coop
FA . 
Proof: See the appendix. 
Since the cooperative formula apportionment internalizes the negative externality, 
MRS coopFA  is smaller than MRS
local
FA . Result 6 does not provide any information whether the 
equilibrium tax rate is efficient or not. But, by the same line of reasoning used in section 
3.1, if MRS coopFA  > 1, then MRS
local
FA  > 1. This relationship states that if tax rates are 
inefficiently under a cooperative formula apportionment, then the distortion will be more 
important under a formula apportionment managed by local state government. The 
formula apportionment is a vehicle through which local governments and multi state firm 
interact with each other. As a result, the cooperative formula apportionment constitutes a 
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welfare improvement for the economy as a whole since result 6 is always satisfied in the 
symmetric equilibrium. The negative externality due to tax competition between local 
governments is mitigated under the cooperative formula apportionment. There is welfare 
loss in the formula apportionment by the local government compared with the 
cooperative formula apportionment.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The implementation of a formula apportionment introduces very complicated incentive 
effects for firms that operate in different jurisdictions and local governments that 
determine the corporate tax rates. In this paper, we consider a tax competition model with 
respect to corporate profit taxes under formula apportionment. We show that in a 
symmetric equilibrium, the tax rate is inefficiently low due to the strategic interaction 
between local governments.  
However, we also show that the degree of inefficiency is less severe when the 
formula relies on output shares. This result holds because capital responsiveness to 
changes in tax rates is lower under a formula that exclusively considers the sales shares 
compared to one that only weighs capital shares. The current shift toward a formula 
apportionment that gives more importance to the sales shares brings the state corporate 
income tax closer to a sales tax. We can then argue that the recent shift by most states in 
the U.S. to a formula apportionment that employs sales shares may constitute an 
improvement in terms of welfare.  
But, there is still a distortion due to tax competition between state governments. 
The distortion takes the form of lower equilibrium tax rates compared to the tax rates 
 84
under a cooperative formula apportionment. As our findings show, a cooperative formula 




1. Proof for Result 4 
MRS kFA  = θ γ k > MRS
f
FA  = θ γ f                                                                












∂ , the proof starts from the 
comparison between reactions of the multi-state firm under output share formula 













∂ | f be the reaction 
under output share.  To compare them, we denote kα ( 1k , 2k ) under capital shares and 
fα ( 1k , 2k ) under output shares. At a symmetric equilibrium,   
kα ( 1k , 2k )  = k
k1  = 
2
1  and k1α ( 1k , 2k )  = 2
2
k




























kf ′ . 
Due to the property of concave production function which is identical across the region, 
the relationship )( 1kf ′ 1k  < )( 1kf  is always true. Therefore, we have the following 
inequality.  
f









= k1α ( 1k , 2k ) 
































− µα  + f1α ])1([ krµπ −+ }.  
Similarly, due to )('' 2kf  < 0 and following inequality holds in absolute value. 
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k
2α ( 1k , 2k )  > 
f
2α ( 1k , 2k ) in  
























































∂  is positive.  




2. Proof for result 5 
Using implicit function theorem, by taking derivative of U( 1g , 1x ) + U( 2g , 2x ) with 
































∂  = 0  
We assume that in a cooperative formula apportionment a public good is allocated based 
on the rule by which marginal utility from the public good in region 1 is equal to 






























∂  = 0. 






























∂ ) 2 ]} 














Then, MRS of region 1 under a cooperative formula apportionment, when marginal 
utility from the public good in region 1 is equal to marginal utility from the public good 






















3. Proof of Result 6 
3RS localFA  > MRS
coop
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∂  and  
the inequality is simplified again as  




































































− µα < 0,                               










































STATE APPORTIONMENT OF CORPORATE 
INCOME 
(Formulas for tax year 2004 -- as of January 1, 2004) 
ALABAMA * 3 Factor  NEBRASKA Sales 
ALASKA * 3 Factor  NEVADA No State Income Tax 
ARIZONA * Double wtd. Sales  NEW HAMPSHIRE Double wtd. Sales 
ARKANSAS * Double wtd. Sales  NEW JERSEY (1) Double wtd. Sales 
CALIFORNIA * Double wtd. Sales  NEW MEXICO * Double wtd. sales 
COLORADO * 3 Factor/Sales & Property  NEW YORK Double wtd sales 
CONNECTICUT Double wtd. sales/Sales  NORTH CAROLINA *  Double wtd. sales 
DELAWARE 3 Factor  NORTH DAKOTA * 3 Factor 
FLORIDA  Double wtd. sales  OHIO * 60% Sales, 20% Property 
GEORGIA Double wtd. sales    & Payroll 
HAWAII * 3 Factor  OKLAHOMA 3 Factor 
IDAHO * Double wtd. sales  OREGON * 80% Sales, 10% Property 
ILLINOIS * Sales   & Payroll 
INDIANA  Double wtd. sales  PENNSYLVANIA * Triple wtd. sales 
IOWA Sales  RHODE ISLAND (2) 40% Sales, 30% Property 
KANSAS * 3 Factor    & Payroll 
KENTUCKY * Double wtd. sales  SOUTH CAROLINA Double wtd. sales/Sales 
LOUISIANA Double wtd. sales  SOUTH DAKOTA No State Income Tax 
MAINE * Double wtd. sales  TENNESSEE * Double wtd. sales 
MARYLAND Double wtd. sales  TEXAS Sales 
MASSACHUSETTS Double wtd. sales/Sales  UTAH * 3 Factor 
MICHIGAN 90% Sales, 5% Property  VERMONT 3 Factor 
  & Payroll  VIRGINIA Double wtd. sales 
MINNESOTA 75% Sales,12.5% Property,  WASHINGTON No State Income Tax 
  and 12.5% Payroll  WEST VIRGINIA * Double wtd. sales 
MISSISSIPPI Accounting/3 Factor  WISCONSIN * Double wtd. sales 
MISSOURI * 3 Factor/sales  WYOMING No State Income Tax 
MONTANA * 3 Factor  DIST. OF COLUMBI 3 Factor 
  
Source: Compiled by FTA from various sources.  
Note: The formulas listed are for general manufacturing businesses. Some industries have special formula 
different than those reported. 
* State has adopted substantial portions of the UDITPA. 
(1) A 3-factor formula is used for corporations not subject to the corporation business franchise tax.  















































5.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I briefly summarize and conclude the contribution of the dissertation to 
the related literature. 
5.1 Collusion, Political Control and Discretion 
In this paper, we examine the conditions under which corruption is observed either at the 
bureaucratic or legislative level. When the political cost is high enough and monitoring is 
very effective, a no-collusion state is likely to be achieved because the high political cost 
disciplines the politician and the efficient monitoring precludes the bureaucrat from 
engaging in a collusive behavior with the firm. However, when the political cost is low, 
high monitoring only disciplines the bureaucrat, and opens an opportunity for the 
politician and firm to collude with each other. According to our model, the political cost 
parameter plays a critical role in preventing collusion.  
In a politician’s initiative regime, the politician decides whether to monitor 
bureaucrat or not. The politician exerts an effort to allow pollution if the transfer to the 
politician in the first stage of the game outweighs the expected payoffs earned by 
monitoring in the second stage of the game. If the transfer to the politician in the first 
stage of the game is smaller than the expected payoffs in the second stage, the politician 
never colludes with the firm in the first stage. No political collusion is achieved at the 
expense of a social cost determined by the amount resources that are required to 
compensate the politician. With a high monitoring cost, the politician gives up 
monitoring, leading to bureaucratic collusion.  
In a voter’s initiative regime, the voter decides the level of monitoring on 
bureaucrats and political cost. No collusion can be obtained by choosing the level of 
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monitoring and political control appropriately relative to the level of deregulation 
benefits. Even in this regime, we cannot exclude the possibility of collusion. If the 
monitoring and political costs are very high, the optimal levels of political pressure and 
monitoring become zero, going back to the situation of bureaucratic or political collusion. 
A no-collusion state is an exceptional social phenomenon according to our model. The 
two stages model captures the whole process of policy making and implementation and 
sheds new insight on corruption in the political and administrative sectors. 
5.2  Policy Preferences on Policy Outcome with an Incompletely Informed  
      Politician 
When the upper middle class and the lower middle class articulate the same political 
messages to the policymaker, the middle class obtains its ideal policy if it pursues a 
moderate policy change from the current status quo. There exists a pooling equilibrium 
which supports a policy change toward the ideal policy of the middle class. This pooling 
equilibrium is robust in the sense that even if the differences between political power are 
significant, an equilibrium which benefits the middle class exists. In the case of an 
important policy change, a conflict of interest between the upper and lower middle class 
may arise. This conflict is avoided if the ideal policies of the two subgroups are very 
close.  
A separating equilibrium where the ideal policies of the upper middle class are 
adopted exists if the differences in political power between social groups are small. It is 
interesting to note that in a separating equilibrium as the proportion of the upper middle 
class increases and ideal policies between subgroups within middle class diverge, the 
probability of rejecting the proposal of the lower middle increases. If the policy change is 
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substantial, a separating equilibrium is not robust, it may increase the divergence within 
the middle class, and weaken the political power of the middle class. Policy transition 
toward hx′  or lx′  is unconditionally supported by the rich or the poor. According to our 
model, the middle class achieves its ideal policy through the internal allegiance and 
outside support from the poor or the rich. But, the degree of policy change should be 
moderate, because drastic policy changes may generate a conflict of interests within the 
middle class. 
5.3 Apportionment Formula and Strategic Competition  
The implementation of a formula apportionment introduces very complicated incentive 
effects for firms that operate in different jurisdictions and local governments that 
determine the corporate tax rates. In this paper, we consider a tax competition model with 
respect to corporate profit taxes under formula apportionment. We show that in a 
symmetric equilibrium, the tax rate is inefficiently low due to the strategic interaction 
between local governments. However, we also show that the degree of inefficiency is less 
severe when the formula relies on output shares. This result holds because capital 
responsiveness to changes in tax rates is lower under a formula that exclusively considers 
the sales shares compared to one that only weighs capital shares.  
The current shift toward a formula apportionment that gives more importance to 
sales shares brings the state corporate income tax closer to a sales tax. We can then argue 
that the recent shift by most states in the U.S. to a formula apportionment that employs 
sales shares may constitute an improvement in terms of welfare. However, there is still a 
distortion due to tax competition between state governments. The distortion takes the 
form of lower equilibrium tax rates compared to the tax rates chosen by a federal 
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government. As our findings show, a formula apportionment implemented by the federal 
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